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Observations on Judicial Approaches to Discerning Investment 
Adviser Status under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
Brian Carroll*, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission/Villanova Law School 
Abstract: This article analyzes judicial approaches to interpreting the definition of an invest-
ment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the United States federal statute gov-
erning investment advisers. It starts by noting the role of investment advisers in the United 
States financial services industry and introduces the statutory definition of an investment advis-
er and each element of this definition. It explains briefly why adviser status is important and 
touches on the relationship between investment adviser status and registration as an invest-
ment adviser with the United States Securities & Exchange Commission. Based on cases initiated 
by the United States Securities & Exchange Commission, the United States Department of Justice 
and investment adviser clients alleging investment adviser violations of the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940, the article discusses key judicial interpretations of the elements of the definition of 
investment adviser. Along the way, the author shares his observations about these judicial ap-
proaches to interpreting the definition of an investment adviser by, among other things, evaluat-
ing some of the strengths and weaknesses reflected in these judicial approaches. 
Keywords: investment adviser; investment advice; investment management; Section 202(a)(11); 
Investment Advisers Act. 
I. Introduction
Under United States federal securities law, the definition of an investment adviser under Section 
202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) covers services provided by 
thousands of investment management professionals ranging from portfolio managers advising 
private investment funds, such as hedge funds, to certain types of personal financial advisers and 
financial planners,1 collectively overseeing trillions of dollars in investment assets.2 The most signifi-
* Brian Carroll, an attorney and a certified public accountant, serves as a Senior Special Counsel at the United States
Securities & Exchange Commission, Philadelphia Regional Office. He is also an Adjunct Professor of Law at Villanova 
Law School. The United States Securities & Exchange Commission (“Commission”) disclaims responsibility for any
private publications or statements of any of the Commission’s employee or commissioner. This article expresses the 
author’s views and does not necessarily reflect those of the Commission, the commissioners, or other members of
the staff. 
1  See SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER EXAMINATIONS 1, 32 (Jan. 2011) (discussing diver-
sity of investment advisory industry as “ranging from small, locally-operated financial planning firms to money 
managers that are part of global financial institutions [...]”).  
2  See id. at 10 (noting that as of Sept. 30, 2010, registered investment advisers managed $ 38.3 trillion in assets); 
see also SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, DODD-FRANK ACT CHANGES TO INVESTMENT ADVISER REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS 5 (Jan. 13, 
2013) (“There are 10,754 advisers registered with the Commission with total assets under management of $ 49.66 
trillion.”).  
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cant part of Section § 202(a)(11) defines an investment adviser as one who “for compensation, 
engages in the business of advising others [...] as to the value of securities or as to the advisability 
of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities [...].”3 While much of the work of these and other 
financial professionals falls clearly under this definition, investment adviser status is not always 
obvious, particularly when dealing with newly created financial services and products.  
This article examines how courts approach the elements of this definition and some of the chal-
lenges they face. It starts by noting briefly why investment adviser status is important. It then 
reviews the complete statutory definition of an investment adviser and touches on the relation-
ship between investment adviser status and investment adviser registration with the U.S. Securi-
ties & Exchange Commission (“Commission”), a federal agency charged with administering the 
Advisers Act. Next, the article identifies the types of cases that may implicate this definition. Final-
ly, it outlines key judicial approaches to interpreting this definition while sharing some observa-
tions about these approaches.  
II. Investment Adviser: Definition, Exceptions and an Exemption 
Investment adviser status is important because it carries with it certain responsibilities and op-
portunities. At the very least, an adviser that meets this definition owes a fiduciary duty to its 
clients4 and is subject to the Commission’s authority to investigate and prosecute in civil proceed-
ings investment adviser fraud under provisions of § 206,5 regardless of whether or not an in-
vestment adviser is required to register with the Commission.6 Similarly, an investment adviser is 
designated by law as a potential whistleblower target under § 21F7 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).8 On the other hand, registered investment advisers may participate as a 
                                                
3  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1940). Hereafter references 
to sections of Advisers Act and rules promulgated thereunder will not be identified as part of the Advisers Act, 
but simply by section number and rule number.  
4  Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (citations omitted) (“The 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a congressional recognition of the delicate fiduciary nature of an 
investment advisory relationship.”); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 n.11 (1977) (“[…] Congress in-
tended the Investment Advisers Act to establish federal fiduciary standards for investment advisers.” (citations 
omitted); Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979) (“[T]he [Advisers] Act’s legislative his-
tory leaves no doubt that Congress intended to impose enforceable fiduciary obligations.”). 
5  See § 206(1)-(2), Prohibited Transactions by Investment Advisers, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1-2), (“It shall be unlawful for 
any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or 
indirectly – (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client; (2) to engage 
in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or pro-
spective client […].”). 
6  See § 206, Prohibited Transactions by Investment Advisers, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, 
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 n.6 (1979) (When amending Section 206 by adding Section 206(4), “[…] Congress also 
extended the provision of § 206 to all investment advisers, whether or not such advisers were required to regis-
ter under § 203 of the [Advisers] Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3. 74 Stat. 887.”); see also “Investment Adviser Status and In-
vestment Adviser Registration with the Commission” in this article. 
7  § 21F Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6; see Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64545 (May 
25, 2011) 3, 76 FR 34300 (June 13, 2011) (adopting rule release) (“Section 21F directs that the Commission pay 
awards, subject to certain limitations and conditions, to whistleblowers who voluntarily provide the Commission 
with original information about a violation of the securities laws that leads to the successful enforcement of an 
action brought by the Commission that results in monetary sanctions exceeding $ 1,000,000.”); see also Exchange 
Act § 3(a)(47), 15 U.S.C. 78c(47) (“The term ‘securities laws’ means [...] the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [...].”).  
8  15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. 
ALJ 1/2015 Observations on Judicial Approaches to Discerning Investment Adviser Status 101 
 
qualified institutional buyer in the private resale of certain securities pursuant to Rule 144A9 of 
the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”).10 Under United States federal securities laws, other 
consequences flow from investment adviser status.11  
Section 202(a)(11) defines an investment adviser and provides eight exceptions12 to this defini-
tion. Section 202(a)(11), in its complete form, defines an investment adviser as “any person 
who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, 
purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as a part of a regular business, 
issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.”13 Some of the terms appear-
ing in this definition are defined further by the Advisers Act.14  
By parsing the language of § 202(a)(11), three categories of investment adviser emerge. The 
first category, which was identified at the beginning of this article, covers persons who are 
engaged in the business of providing advice to others on investment in or the value of securi-
ties for compensation. Those meeting this definitional language are referred to in this article 
simply as investment advisers. The second category of investment adviser covers persons who 
provide investment advice through publications or writings, and are referred to in this article 
as “Publication Advisers.”15 The third category includes those who, for compensation, are in the 
regular business of issuing analyses or reports on securities, and are referred to as “Report  
                                                
9  See Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) § 5(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(d); Securities Act Rule 144A, Private Resale of 
Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 144A (defining a qualified institutional buyer as “[a]ny investment adviser 
registered under the Investment Advisers Act.”); see also Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicita-
tion and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3524 
(July 10, 2013) 3, 78 FR 44771 (July 24, 2013) (adopting rule release) (footnote omitted) (“The term ‘Rule 144A 
offering’ in this release refers to a primary offering of securities by an issuer to one or more financial inter-
mediaries – commonly known as the ‘initial purchasers’ – in a transaction that is exempt from registration 
pursuant to § 4(a)(2) or Regulation S under the Securities Act, followed by the resale of those securities by the 
initial purchasers to QIBs [qualified institutional buyers] in reliance on Rule 144A.”).  
10  15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.  
11  See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43154 (Aug. 15, 2000) 1, 65 FR 56,716 
(Aug. 24, 2000) (adopting rule release) (“Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) is a new issuer disclosure rule that ad-
dresses selective disclosure. The regulation provides that when an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, dis-
closes material nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons (in general, securities market profes-
sionals and holders of the issuer’s securities who may well trade on the basis of the information), it must 
make public disclosure of that information.”); Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(iii) (identifying invest-
ment advisers as defined under § 202(a)(11) as a member of a class of recipients of material nonpublic infor-
mation triggering public disclosure of that information).  
12  Section 202(a)(11)(A)-(G), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(A)-(G). In addition to these exclusions under § 202(a)(11),  
§ 202(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(b), excludes the application of the Advisers Act to certain federal and state gov-
ernment agencies, instrumentalities and officers. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553, 567-568 
(2d Cir. 2009) (interpreting § 202(b)).  
13  Section 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11); see also Exchange Act § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(2) (definition of 
investment adviser identical to definition of investment adviser under § 202(a)(11)). But see § 2(a)(20) Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (definition of investment ad-
viser different than § 202(a)(11) definition). See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Investment Management Staff Issue 
of Interest, “Persons Who Provide Advice Solely Regarding Matters Not Concerning Securities,” 4 (comparing 
Advisers Act § 202(a)(11) (definition of investment adviser) with Investment Company Act § 2(a)(20) (definition 
of investment adviser)).  
14  See, e.g., § 202(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(5) (defining “company”); § 202(a)(16), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(16) (defining 
“person”).  
15  For a discussion of what is referred to in this article as a “Publication Adviser,” see Lowe v. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, 472 U.S. 181 (1985) (application of § 202 (a)(11) to an investment adviser who publishes a newsletter 
offering impersonal investment advice).  
ALJ 1/2015 Brian Carroll 102 
 
Advisers.”16 Although this article focuses on discerning investment adviser status under the first 
category of investment adviser, Publication Advisers and Report Advisers marginally come into 
play when discussing investment adviser status. 
This definition of an investment adviser is limited by eight exceptions under § 202(a)(11)(A)-(G).17 
Only those exceptions that add significantly to our discussion of investment adviser status are 
noted. Two categories of exceptions stand out. First, there are two “solely incidental” exceptions, 
which play a recurring role. Section 202(a)(11)(B) excepts from the definition of an investment 
adviser lawyers, accountants, engineers and teachers who perform investment adviser services 
that are “solely incidental” to their professional practice.18 Similarly, § 202(a)(11)(C) excepts a bro-
ker or dealer if it performs investment adviser services that are “solely incidental” to their broker 
or dealer business and does not receive any “special compensation” for these investment adviser 
services.19 The second exception category authorizes the Commission to create exceptions. Under  
§ 202(a)(11)(H), the Commission is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations or issue orders 
excluding from the definition of an investment adviser “other persons not within the intent” 20 of 




                                                
16  For examples of what is referred to in this article as a “Report Adviser,” see, e.g., Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 
F.2d 860, 862, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978) (interpreting the application of § 202(a)(11) to investment adviser 
that, inter alia, issued reports); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Saltzman, 127 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (same); Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n v. Smith, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22352 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 1995) (same). But see Pozez v. Ethanol Capital 
Management, LLC, 2009 WL 2176574 (D. Arz. 2009) (reports did not adequately concern securities).  
17  See § 202(a)(11)(A-G). In summary and without noting limitations, these exceptions generally cover certain (A) 
banks and bank holding companies unless it provides as defined under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956; 
(B) professional offering investment advice that is “solely incidental” to their professional services; (C) broker and 
dealers offering investment adviser this is “solely incidental” to brokerage services and without receiving special 
compensation for the investment advice; (D) certain “bona fide” newspapers and other types of publications; (E) 
persons advising exclusively on securities designated by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to § 3(a)(12) of 
the Securities Exchange Act; (F) nationally recognized statistical rating organization, as defined under § 3(a)(62) of 
the Securities Exchange Act; (G) advisers offering family office services, as defined by the Commission; and (H) 
advisers excluded by Commission rule, regulation or order. Except as noted in the article text, discussions of these 
exceptions are beyond the scope of this article.  
18  See § 202(a)(11)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(B); Crabtree Invs., Inc. v. Aztec Enters., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 448, 450 (M.D. 
La. 1979) (investment advice provided by certified public accountant “incidental”); S & D Trading Academy, LLC v. 
AAFIS, Inc., 2008 WL 2325167 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (discussing teacher exception to definition of investment adviser 
under Texas Securities Act, the language of which is identical to § 202(a)(11)(B)). See generally Brian Carroll, SEC Ju-
risdiction over Investment Advice, 192 J. ACCOUNTANCY, Aug. 2001, at 32. 
19  See § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C); Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011) (anal-
ysis of “solely incidental” and “special compensation” language of § 202(a)(11)(C)); Fin. Planning Ass’n v. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (vacating Commission rule, Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to 
be Investment Advisers, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424 (Apr. 19, 2005), permitting broker-dealer to receive special compen-
sation for investment advice but still maintain exemption from definition of investment adviser); see also Sec & 
Exch. Comm’n v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998) (broker-dealer received special compensa-
tion for providing non-incidental investment advice); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Rauscher Pierce, Refsnes, Inc., 17 F. 
Supp. 2d 985 (D. Ariz. 1998) (broker-dealer investment advice not “solely incidental”); Polera v. Altorfer, Podesta, 
Woolard and Co., 503 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (broker-dealer investment advice “solely incidental”).  
20  Section 202(a)(11)(H), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(H). See Atwater v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 2007 WL 
1020848 (N.D. Ga. 2007). (Commission exemption under § 202(a)(11)(H), formerly § 202(a)(11)(G), noted).  
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III. Investment Adviser Status and Investment Adviser Registration  
with the Commission 
Once the definition of an investment adviser is met, the adviser may or may not be required to 
register with the Commission. Sections 203 and 203A, and rules promulgated by the Commission 
thereunder, outline the circumstances triggering investment adviser registration.21 Commission 
registration carries with it a host of obligations as reflected in the Advisers Act and its rules 
promulgated by the Commission. These obligations include, for example, filing with the Commis-
sion a registration form, Uniform Application for Investment Adviser Registration (“Form ADV”),22 
and maintaining certain books and records,23 which are subject to Commission examination.24 As 
noted, while § 206, antifraud provisions generally apply to both registered and unregistered in-
vestment advisers,25 not all antifraud rules promulgated by the Commission pursuant to § 206(4)26 
apply to all investment advisers.27    
                                                
21  See § 203, Registration of Investment Advisers, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3; § 203A, State and Federal Responsibilities, 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-3A (establishing requirements for Commission registration and exclusion from Commission registra-
tion). The Commission has promulgated a series of rules interpreting the reach of these provisions. See, e.g., Rule 
203A-1, Eligibility for SEC Registration: Switching to or from SEC Registration, 17 C.F.R. § 275.3A-1; Rule 203A-2, 
Exemption from Prohibition on SEC Registration, 17 C.F.R. § 275.3A-2.  
22  See § 203(c)(1)(A)-(H), Procedure for Registration; Filing of Application, Effective Date of Registration; Amend-
ments of Registration, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c)(1) (requiring certain investment advisers to complete and file with the 
Commission Form ADV); Rule 203-1, Application for Investment Adviser Registration, 17 C.F.R. § 275.3-1; see also 
Amendments to Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3060 (July 28, 2010), 75 FR 49234 (Aug. 12, 2010) 
(adopting rule release).  
23  See § 204, Annual and Other Reports, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4; Rule 204-2, Books and Records to Be Maintained by 
Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 275.4-2. 
24  See § 204(a), Annual and Other Reports, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(a) (“All records (as so defined) of such investment 
advisers are subject at any time, or from time to time, to such reasonable periodic, special, or other examina-
tions by representatives of the Commission as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public in-
terest or for the protection of investors.”). See generally Brian Carroll, When the SEC Knocks …, 194 J. ACCOUNTANCY, 
Aug. 2002, at 35.  
25  See § 206(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1-2) (“It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly – (1) to employ any device, scheme, or ar-
tifice to defraud any client or prospective client; (2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business 
which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client […].”); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (seminal case interpreting the reach of § 206(2) as impos-
ing on investment advisers a fiduciary duty owed to clients). See generally Brian Carroll, How To Prevent Investment 
Adviser Fraud, 201 J. ACCOUNTANCY, Jan. 2006, at 40; Brian Carroll, The Mutual Fund Trading Scandals, 198 J. ACCOUNT-
ANCY, Dec. 2004, at 32.  
26  See § 206(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4), (“It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly – […] (4) to engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purpose of this 
paragraph (4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, 
practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.”). 
27  Pursuant to § 206(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4), the Commission to date has promulgated eight anti-fraud rules. Five 
anti-fraud rules state that the rule applies to “any registered investment adviser or required to be registered.” 
See Rule 206(4)-1, Advertisements by Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 275.6(4)-1. See Brian Carroll, Investment Ad-
viser Advertising, 196 J. ACCOUNTANCY, Nov. 2003, at 39; Rule 206(4)-2, Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by 
Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 274.6(4)-2. See Brian Carroll, Custody of Client Assets under Rule 206(4)-2, 1 J. INV. 
COMPLIANCE, Spring 2001, at 47 (discussing predecessor rule to current Rule 206(4)-2); Rule 206(4)-3, Cash Pay-
ments for Client Solicitations, 17 C.F.R. § 275.6(4)-3. See Brian Carroll, Third-Party Cash Solicitation Arrangements 
under Rule 206(4)-3 of the Investment Advisers Act, Inv. Counsel Ass’n of America, Dec. 8, 2000, 1, 7; Rule 206(4)-6, 
Proxy Voting, 17 C.F.R. § 275.6(4)-6;, and Rule 206(4)-7, Compliance Procedures and Practices, 17 C.F.R. § 275.6(4)-7. 
In contrast, Rule 206(4)-5, Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 275.6(4)-5, states 
that it applies to “any investment adviser registered (or required to be registered) with the Commission, or un-
registered in reliance on the exemption available under § 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act […].” Finally, Rule 206(4)-8, 
Pooled Investment Vehicles, 17 C.F.R. § 275.6(4)-8, states that it applies to “any investment adviser to a pooled 
investment vehicle.”   
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Investment adviser registration requirements have changed over time.28 For example, histori-
cally, many investment advisers advising private funds,29 such as hedge funds,30 relied on a so-
called private adviser exemption under former § 203(b)(3) as a basis for avoiding investment 
adviser registration with the Commission. This exemption applied to an investment adviser 
that maintained fewer than fifteen clients within a discrete twelve-month period, did not hold 
itself out to the public as an investment adviser,31 and did not provide advice to an investment 
company.32 In 2004, however, the Commission promulgated a rule reinterpreting the term 
“client,”33 which caused the exemption to be applied more narrowly.34 As a result, many in-
vestment advisers to private funds were required to register with the Commission. In 2006 the 
court in Goldstein v. SEC found the Commission’s reinterpretation of “client” was arbitrary and 
vacated this Commission rule.35 More recent amendments to the Advisers Act eliminated this 
private adviser exemption,36 again triggering Commission registration for many investment 
advisers advising private funds. Currently, investment advisers to a wide range of private 
funds37 are now required to register with the Commission.38  
 
 
                                                
28  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 410, PL 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 1, 
2010) (“Dodd-Frank Act”), inter alia, amending § 203A, State and Federal Responsibilities, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3A 
(effectively increasing minimum amount of client assets under management from $ 25 to $ 100 million for 
Commission registration of certain investment advisers).   
29  See § 202(a)(29), § 80b-2(a)(29) (“The term ‘private fund’ means an issuer that would be an investment company, 
as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act.”); 
see also Rule 206(4)-8, Pooled Investment Vehicles, 17 C.F.R. § 275.6(4)-8.  
30  Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2333 
(Dec. 2, 2004) 4, 69 FR 72054, 72055 (Dec. 10, 2004) (adopting rule release), vacated, Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (footnotes omitted) (“There is no statutory or regulatory definition of 
hedge fund, although many have several characteristics in common. Hedge funds are organized by profes-
sional investment managers who frequently have a significant stake in the funds they manage and receive a 
management fee that includes a substantial share of the performance of the fund. Advisers organize and oper-
ate hedge funds in a manner that avoids regulation as investment companies under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940, and hedge funds do not make public offerings of their securities.”) 
31  See “Engaged in the Business” section of this article for a discussion of the concept of an investment adviser 
“holding out” to the public. 
32  See former Section 203(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3), and Rule 203(3)(b)-1, 17 C.F.R. § 275.3(3)(b)-1.   
33  See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 
2333 (Dec. 2, 2004), 69 FR 72054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (adopting rule release), (inter alia, reinterpreting the term “cli-
ent” as it appears in § 203(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3), and defined under Rule 203(b)(3)-1(a)(2), 17 C.F.R.  
§ 275.3(b)(3)-1(a)(2)).  
34  See Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (vacating Registration Under the Advisers 
Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2333 (Dec. 2, 2004), 69 FR 72054 
(Dec. 10, 2004) (adopting rule release)). 
35  See id.  
36  § 403 Dodd-Frank Act amended § 203 by eliminating the § 203(b)(3) private adviser exemption. See also Rules 
Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3221 
(June 22, 2011) n.4, 76 FR 42950 (July 19, 2011) (adopting rule release). 
37  See, e.g., § 203(m), Exemption of and Reporting by Certain Private Fund Advisers, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m); Rule 
203(m)-1, Private Fund Adviser Exemption, 17 C.F.R. § 275.3(m)-l; Section 203(l), Exemption of Venture Capital 
Fund Advisers, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(l); Rule 203(l)-1, Venture Capital Fund Defined, 17 CFR § 275.3(l)-1. See gener-
ally Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less Than $ 150 million in 
Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3222 (June 22, 
2011), 76 FR 39646 (July 6, 2011).   
38  SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, DODD-FRANK ACT CHANGES TO INVESTMENT ADVISER REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS 5 (Jan. 2, 2013) 
(reporting on number of registered investment advisers advising private funds such as hedge funds, private 
equity funds, venture capital funds, securitized asset funds, liquidity funds and the like).  
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IV. Cases that Implicate the Investment Adviser Definition 
Three types of cases inform this discussion on the definition of an investment adviser. The first is 
Commission enforcement actions filed in federal court alleging a violation of the Advisers Act.39 
These enforcement actions require that the Commission establish investment adviser status as a 
basis for subject matter jurisdiction.40 Second, the U.S. Department of Justice is authorized to 
initiate criminal prosecutions against investment advisers for violating the Advisers Act,41 which 
also requires establishing investment adviser status. Similarly, in criminal prosecutions, invest-
ment adviser status may play a role in calculating an appropriate criminal sentence under U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines.42 When sentencing a defendant convicted of committing a federal crime, 
the court may consider whether the defendant was acting as an investment adviser, as defined 
under § 202(a)(11), which could serve as a basis for lengthening the sentence.43 Third, the Advis-
ers Act permits certain investment adviser clients44 to seek a limited private-civil remedy45 against 
an investment adviser based primarily on contract law. If successful in establishing a violation of 
the Advisers Act,46 an advisory client may seek to rescind the investment adviser contract, recover 
                                                
39  See § 203, Registration of Investment Advisers, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3; § 209, Enforcement of Title, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9. 
Sections 203 and 209, inter alia, authorize the Commission to initiate enforcement actions against investment advis-
ers and persons associated with an investment adviser for violating the Advisers Act in United States district court or 
as an administrative proceeding, or both. See also Commission Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.300-360 (rules gov-
erning administrative proceedings). See generally Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (the Commission appears “not as an ordinary litigant, but as a statutory guardian angel charged with safe-
guarding the public interest in enforcing the securities laws”).  
40  See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2003) (an enforcement action 
alleging, inter alia, a violation of § 206, court applied “conduct test” as basis for subject matter jurisdiction); Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n v. Smith, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22352 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Conrardy v. Ribadeneira, 1990 WL 66603 (D. 
Kan. 1990) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to private action against an investment adviser).  
41  See § 217, Penalties, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17. (“Any person who willfully violates any provision of this subchapter, or 
any rule, regulation, or order promulgated by the Commission under authority thereof, shall, upon conviction, be 
fined not more than $ 10,000, imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.”); see, e.g., U.S. v. Eberhard, 525 
F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2008) (defendant convicted of, inter alia, investment adviser fraud in violation of § 206); U.S. v. 
Gilman, 478 F.3d 440 (1st Cir. 2007) (defendant pleaded guilty to, inter alia, investment adviser fraud in violation 
of § 206); U.S. v. Mintz, 2010 WL 3075477 (W.D.N.C. 2010) (defendant pleaded guilty to one count of fraud by an 
investment adviser in violation of § 206).  
42  See U.S. v. Onsa, 2013 WL 789182 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d 523 Fed. App’x 63 (2d Cir. 2013).  
43  See, e.g., U.S. v. Stein, 2010 WL 678122 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (defendant’s investment adviser status resulted in four-
point enhancement in sentencing calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(17)(A)(iii)); see also U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 245-46 (2005) (rendering sentencing guidelines “advisory”.). 
44  See § 215, Validity of Contracts, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15; see, e.g., Rifkin v. Bear Stearns & Co., 248 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 
2001) (taxpayers lack standing to vindicate county’s right under its agreement with an investment adviser); Oliver v. 
Black Knight Asset Management, LLC, 812 F. Supp. 2d 2, 13 (D.D.C. 2011) (“As the Supreme Court has stated, sec-
tions 206 and 215 were intended to benefit the clients of investment advisers.”) (italics in original); Kassover v. 
UBS AG, 619 F. Supp. 2d 28, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Courts have required plaintiffs to allege that the parties entered 
into an investment advisory contract in order for the Advisers Act to apply.”); Shaidi v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 2003 WL 21488228 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (shareholders of fund were beneficiaries but lacked standing to 
assert a claim under § 215 based on fund-adviser contract). 
45  See Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979) (holding that no private right of action 
exists under § 206 but §§ 214 and 215 create, based on equity principles, a private injunctive and contract reces-
sion action against the continued operation of a contract between the adviser and its clients, with a restitution 
claim seeking recovery of contractual fees paid by the client to the adviser); see Brian Carroll, Investment Advisers: 
The Bounds of Regulatory Authority and Private Causes of Action, 10 INV. LAWYER 1, 17 (Oct. 2003); see also Reg’l 
Props., Inc. v. Fin. and Real Estate Consulting Co., 678 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1982) (comparing Advisers Act § 215 with 
Exchange Act § 29).    
46  A private action under § 215 must be based on a violation of the Advisers Act. See, e.g., Laird v. Intergrated Res., 
Inc. 897 F.2d 826, 841 (5th Cir. 1990) (plaintiff may allege “any provision of this chapter” to sustain a violation of  
§ 215); In re Mutual Fund Investment Litigation, 384 F. Supp. 2d 873 (D. Md. 2005); see Brian Carroll, Investment 
Advisers: The Bounds of Regulatory Authority and Private Causes of Action, 10 INV. LAWYER 1, 17 (Oct. 2003).  
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limited restitution and enjoin the further operation of the contract.47 Although there are other 
types of actions that may call into play investment adviser status,48 the vast majority of federal 
court actions interpreting § 202(a)(11) are initiated by one of these three parties.  
V. Observations on Judicial Approaches to Discerning Investment  
Adviser Status 
This article focuses on judicial approaches to interpreting investment adviser status. For pur-
poses of this discussion, the elements of the definition of an investment adviser are that a 
person: 1) engages in the business of providing 2) investment advice 3) to others 4) concerning 
securities 5) for compensation. The discussion of each element varies according to the issues 
raised in relevant judicial decisions and the nature of the author’s observations offered along 
the way. Some elements provoke more commentary than others.  
Because this article focuses on judicial approaches, Commission or Commission staff guidance 
on investment adviser status is generally discussed to the extent that it is relied upon in a judi-
cial opinion. Two key examples come to mind. In the Matter of Augustus P. Loring, Jr., (“In re Lor-
ing”),49 a Commission order exempting a court-supervised trustee from the definition of in-
vestment adviser pursuant to § 202(a)(11)(H), has played a recurrent role in determining 
whether certain trust services meet the definition of an investment adviser and the role of 
“solely incidental” advice. Also significant is a Commission staff interpretive guidance discuss-
ing application of the definition of an investment adviser to certain financial services. In “Ap-
plicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other 
Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component of Other Financial Ser-
vices”50 (“SEC Release 1092”) Commission staff, not the Commission, express views on how 






                                                
47  Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) (Section 215 “permitting federal suit for 
recission of a contract or injunction against continued operation of the contract, and for restitution”.); see also 
Douglass v. Beakley, 900 F. Supp. 2d 736, 746 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (“[…] the only apparent remedy available to an 
aggrieved investor under the IAA, aside from rescission, would be commissions, fees, or other compensation 
paid to the investment adviser pursuant to the investment contract.”); Filson v. Langman, 2002 WL 31528616 
(D. Mass. 2002) (no claim for damages permitted under Section 215); Fraioli v. Lemcke, 328 F. Supp. 2d 250 
(D.R.I. 2004) (dismissed action because lost investment not recoverable and no standing to sue adviser).   
48  In addition to these types of cases, other potential parties may initiate civil or criminal actions implicating 
investment adviser status. See, e.g., Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38)(B) 
(incorporating by reference definition of an investment adviser under Advisers Act); West’s Ann. Cal. Corp. 
Code § 25009 (defining an investment adviser under California law); McKinney’s General Business Law § 359-
eee(a) (defining an investment adviser under New York law); see generally Uniform Securities Act of 1956 § 401(f) 
(defining an investment adviser).  
49  Investment Advisers Act Release No. 33, 1942 WL 34539 (July 22, 1942); see also In the Matter of Augustus P. 
Loring, Jr., 11 S.E.C. 885, Investment Company Act Release No. 33, 1942 WL 34853 (July 20, 1942).  
50  Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1092 (Oct. 8, 1987), 52 FR 38400 (Oct. 16, 1987) (interpretive release). 
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A. Advice Must Concern Securities 
An investment adviser must provide advice concerning securities.51 The definition of a security 
under § 202(a)(18)52 is consistent with other United States federal securities statutes’ definition of 
a security.53 Consequently, these definitions are generally interpreted as a single body of law.54  
This body of law reflects several interpretative themes. Consistent with the broad legislative goal 
of United States federal securities laws to eliminate serious abuses in the securities markets, 
courts view as securities not only financial instruments that fall within the ordinary concept of a 
security, but also “virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment”.55 When deciding 
whether an instrument meets the definition of a security, courts are not bound by any legal for-
malism,56 rather they engage in a case-by-case57 examination of the economic reality underlying 
the transaction.58 Two Supreme Court opinions anchor the framework for determining whether a 
security is created: SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.59 and Reves v. Ernst & Young.60 In addition, Congress con-
tinues to play a legislative role in defining a security.61 At bottom, the breath of the definition of 
an investment adviser is tied directly to the definition of a security. As more financial instruments 
are created and meet the definition of a security, the scope of investment adviser status corre-
spondingly expands. 
                                                
51  See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., 608 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1979) (commod-
ities advice does not meet securities advice requirement under § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11); Mechigian v. 
Art Capital Corp., 639 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (art purchase does not meet securities advice requirement un-
der § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)).  
52  Section 202(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18), defines a security as “any note, stock, treasury stock, security future 
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment con-
tract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other 
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security (including a certificate of deposit) or on 
any group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call 
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in 
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’, or any certificate on interest or participation 
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase 
any of the foregoing.” 
53  See Securities Act, § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); Exchange Act, § 3(a)(10); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1), Investment Com-
pany Act, § 2(a)(36), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36). 
54  See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 n.1 (1990); 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).   
55  Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990). 
56  Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004) (“Congress’ purpose in enacting the securities laws was 
to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are called. [...] To that end, 
it enacted a broad definition of ‘security,’ sufficient to ‘encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as 
an investment.’”) (emphasis in original). 
57  See U.S. v Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990)).  
58  See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
59  328 U.S. 293 (1946). Under SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) and its progeny, the Supreme Court estab-
lished a multiple factor test for determining when an investment contract constitutes a security, including hori-
zontal and vertical commonality tests.   
60  494 U.S. 56 (1990). Under Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990), the Court adopted the “Family Resem-
blance” approach for determining when a note may meet the definition of a security. It applied a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a note is a security unless it bears a “family resemblance” to a judicially recognized list of notes 
that do not meet the definition of a security.    
61  For example, §§ 761(a)(2) and 768(a)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act amend the definition of a security under the Ex-
change Act § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a), and Securities Act § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)-(1), respectively, to define a 
security-based swap as a security. See also SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, LIFE SETTLEMENTS TASK FORCE, STAFF REPORT TO THE 
U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (July 22, 2010) (recommending that the Commission considers requesting 
Congress to amending the definition of a security under federal securities law to include life settlements).   
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B. Compensation for Investment Advice 
Section 202(a)(11) requires that an investment adviser be compensated for providing investment 
advice.62 Unlike the definition of a security, the term compensation is neither defined by the Advis-
ers Act nor is there a single body of United States federal securities law interpreting it. In the 
investment advisory business, it is common practice for investment advisers to be compensated 
by receiving a fee from clients based on a percentage of the amount of client’s funds managed by 
the adviser or based on the rate of return on investments made by the adviser on behalf of the 
client, or some combination of both.63 Beyond these widely recognized forms of compensation, 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals64 has adopted an approach to interpreting the compensa-
tion element that is referred to in this article as the economic benefit approach. After presenting 
this approach, the discussion turns to two observations. The first discusses other provisions of 
United States federal securities law that may support further developing the economic benefit 
approach. The second takes an entirely different tact by offering a contract analysis approach.  
1. The Eleventh Circuit’s Economic Benefit Approach 
The seeds of the economic benefit approach were sowed into the Eleventh Circuit by U.S. v. Elliott.65 
In appealing their criminal convictions under the Advisers Act, two defendants argued that they 
had not received a discrete fee for investment advice, were not compensated for investment 
advice and therefore were not investment advisers. Each defendant, however, had advised cli-
ents to invest in “investment vehicles”66 created and marketed by defendants. One defendant 
received sales commissions67 charged on client purchases of these investment vehicles and the 
other comingled client investment funds in his personal account to pay living expenses. The court 
                                                
62  See, e.g., Korman v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 592 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (upholding Commission finding that advis-
er had provided investment advice for compensation); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. SBM Inv. Certificates, Inc., 2007 
WL 609888 (D. Md. 2007) (evidence of compensation insufficient to grant Commission motion for preliminary in-
junction against future violations of Advisers Act); Washington v. Baenziger, 656 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1987) 
(failure to allege compensation element); Brown v. Producers Livestock Loan Co., 469 F. Supp. 27 (D. Utah 1977) 
(failure to allege compensation element). But see Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 3043 (July 1, 2010), 38 & n.121, 75 FR 41018 (July 15, 2010) (adopting rule release) 
(“Rule 206(4)-5(a)(1) makes it unlawful for investment advisers covered by this rule to provide investment adviso-
ry services for compensation to a government entity within two years after a trigger [political] contribution. […]. 
The adviser, therefore, should return all such compensation promptly upon discovering the triggering contribu-
tion.”) (italics in original).   
63  See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting investment adviser management fee 
of one percent of investment fund assets under management and incentive fee of twenty percent of fund’s net 
gains); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1978) (investment adviser earned a fee equal to twenty 
percent of the firm’s net profit and net capital gains for each year and, for some years, an annual salary); Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n v. Juno, 2012 WL 685302 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (investment performance-based fee viewed as compensa-
tion); U.S. v. Young, 2011 WL 1376045 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (noting payment for investment advisory services); Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n v. Rabinovich & Associates, 2008 WL 4937360 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (fifty percent share of trading profits 
from client investments viewed as compensation); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Saltzman, 127 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Pa. 
2001) (receipt of twenty percent of investment fund’s net profit and net capital gains as compensation).  
64  See 28 U.S.C. § 43 (a) (“There shall be in each circuit a court of appeals, which shall be a court of record, known as 
the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit.”). See generally Litman v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 
1506, 1508 (11th Cir. 1987) (“As early as 1789, Congress created district courts and circuit courts. Judiciary Act of 
1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. In 1891, Congress passed the Evarts Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826, which estab-
lished the circuit court of appeals as a separate intermediate level court.”) The Eleventh Circuit is one of thirteen 
geographically based judicial circuits within the United States Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 41.    
65  62 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 1996), order amending opinion, 82 F.3d 989 (11th Cir. 1996). 
66  Id. at 1310-11. (court does not specify legal form of the “investment vehicles”).   
67  Id. at 1310. In Elliott, the court does not address whether this conduct meets the definition of a broker or dealer 
under federal securities law.       
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summarily rejected a discrete fee requirement by holding that even though defendants had not 
received a separate fee, they did receive compensation (sales commissions and comingling client 
funds) for investment advice. It found support for its holding in SEC Release 1092, particularly the 
court’s italicized sentence: 
“This reading of § 80b-2(a)(11) is consistent with the SEC’s definition of compensation for invest-
ment advice. The SEC Release [1092] states: This compensation element is satisfied by the receipt 
of any economic benefit, whether in the form of an advisory fee or some other fee relating to the 
total services rendered, commissions, or some combination of the foregoing. It is not necessary 
that a person who provides investment advisory and other services to a client charge a separate fee for 
the investment advisory portion of the total services.”68  
While Elliot makes clear that receipt of a discrete fee is not required to meet the compensation 
element, the importance of this decision lies not with this narrow holding but with its inclusion of 
the “economic benefit” language in its quotation of SEC Release 1092. Although Elliot does not 
explicitly identify or rely upon this language,69 this reference has led to a series of cases within 
the Eleventh Circuit adopting the economic benefit approach. For example, in U.S. v. Ogale,70 an 
unpublished opinion,71 the defendant, convicted of wire fraud, appealed the application of a 
sentencing guidelines enhancement based on his status as an investment adviser. The defendant 
argued that he was not acting as an investment adviser, in part, because he was not compen-
sated for investment advice. He argued that the investor funds that he misappropriated for per-
sonal use were “ill-gotten gains,”72 not compensation. The court in Ogale relied on Elliott’s inclu-
sion of the economic benefit language in SEC Release 1092 as its authority for holding that “the 
receipt of any economic benefit qualifies as compensation under the Investment Advisers Act […].”73  
Application of the economic benefit approach was extended within the Eleventh Circuit in Thomas 
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.74 In Thomas, the court was called upon to decide what 
type of compensation met the “special compensation” requirement under § 202(a)(11)(C), the 
                                                
68  Elliott at 3011 n.8 (emphasis in original). 
69  This reference to economic benefit tends to support implicitly Elliott’s holding that a defendant’s comingling of 
client funds to pay personal expenses satisfied the compensation element.     
70  378 Fed. App’x 959 (11th Cir. 2010). 
71  Joyner v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4530678 7 n.11 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (“Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals are not considered binding authority; however, they may be cited as persuasive authority pursuant to 
the Eleventh Circuit Rules, 11th Cir. R. 36-2.”).  
72  See Ogale at 960-61. Generally, the term “ill-gotten gains” is used to describe funds obtained through a violation 
of federal securities laws and subject to disgorgement, an equitable remedy available in certain Commission en-
forcement actions. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Platforms Wireless Inter. Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1096 (9th Cir. 
2010) (citations omitted) (“A district court has broad equity powers to order disgorgement of ill-gotten gains ob-
tained through the violation of securities laws. Disgorgement is designed to deprive a wrongdoer of unjust en-
richment, and to deter others from violating securities laws by making violations unprofitable.”); Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (tracing development of disgorgement as an equitable 
remedy).  
73  See Ogale at 960-61. (“The receipt of any economic benefit qualifies as compensation under the Investment 
Adviser’s [sic] Act and thus the investment adviser enhancement. See id. [Elliott] at 1131 (‘Th[e] compensation el-
ement is satisfied by the receipt of any economic benefit, whether in the form of an advisory fee or some other 
fee relating to the total services rendered, commissions, or some combination of the foregoing.’) (quoting SEC 
Release notes for 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) […]”). Ogale appears to be relying on Elliott’s finding that one of the de-
fendant’s had comingled investor funds and used investor funds for personal expenses. As noted, Elliott, howev-
er, did not explicitly apply the economic benefit approach to these funds, or any other compensation issue in the 
case. See also U.S. v. Ellia, 2014 WL 4289389 (Cir. 11) (quoting Ogale quoting Elliott in holding that personal use of 
investor funds meets the compensation element); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Young, 2011 WL 1376045 7 (E.D. Pa. 
2011) (noting Ogale held that “ill-gotten gains qualify as compensation under the Advisers Act”).  
74  631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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broker-dealer exception to the definition of an investment adviser.75 Initially the court reviewed 
Elliot’s any economic benefit language of SEC Release 1092 to note that the compensation ele-
ment has been “defined broadly.”76 Thomas went on to view the compensation component of the 
“special compensation” branch under the broker-dealer exception as a “subset of the economic 
benefit received from a transaction involving investment advice.”77 With Thomas, the economic 
benefit approach gained further acceptance as the Eleventh Circuit’s primary approach for inter-
preting not only the compensation element in the definition of an investment adviser but the 
special compensation component of the broker-dealer exception to this definition. In contrast, no 
other circuits have explicitly considered the economic benefit approach when interpreting any 
provision under § 202(a)(11).    
2. Advisers Act Support for Developing the Economic Benefit Approach 
Under the Advisers Act, Form ADV requires an investment adviser to disclose its receipt of an 
“economic benefit” from a source other than the client in connection with giving investment advice. 
This disclosure requirement seeks to reveal whether an adviser has a conflict of interest created 
by the adviser receiving an economic benefit from another party for recommending an invest-
ment to a client.78 An adviser’s failure to meet this requirement may violate § 207, Material Mis-
statements,79 which prohibits an adviser from making an untrue statement of material fact or 
omitting a required material fact in certain Commission filings, including Form ADV.    
 Judicial analysis of this economic benefit language in deciding whether a violation of § 207 is 
established may prove helpful in developing the economic benefit approach for interpreting 
compensation under § 202(a)(11). In Vernazza v. SEC,80 an enforcement action, the court held that 
an investment adviser violated § 207 by failing to disclose on its Form ADV,81 among other places, 
the existence of two intertwined financial incentives offered by another investment adviser spon-
soring investment funds. Under the first incentive, the adviser’s clients had to invest at least a 
total of $ 1 million in certain investment funds in order for the adviser to be eligible to receive a 
success fee.82 The second incentive was the actual success fee based on a percentage of client 
funds invested in the investment funds.83  
In Vernazza, both forms of incentive were viewed by the court as requiring disclosure under the 
economic benefit language of Form ADV. This is important because the first incentive-meeting the  
                                                
75  The broker-dealer exception to the definition of an investment adviser reads as follows: “any broker or dealer 
whose performance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and 
who receives no special compensation thereof.” Section 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 2(a)(11)(C). 
76  See Thomas 631 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Elliott, 62 F.3d at 1311 n.8 (citation omitted)). 
77  Id. at 1165. 
78  Rule 203-1, Application for Investment Adviser Registration, 17 C.F.R. § 275.3-1. See, e.g., Amendments to Form 
ADV, Investment Advisers Release No. 3060 (July 28, 2010), 75 FR 49234 (Aug. 12, 2010).   
79  See § 207, Material Misrepresentations, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7, which reads as follows: “It shall be unlawful for any 
person willfully to make any untrue statement of a material fact in any registration application or report filed 
with the Commission under Section 203 or 204, or willfully to omit to state in any such application or report any 
material fact which is required to be stated therein.”  
80  Vernazza v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 327 F.3d 851, 861 (9th Cir. 2003). 
81  Id. at 856 (Form ADV, Part II, Question 13(A) requests information concerning “whether the investment adviser, 
or a related person, ‘receives some economic benefit [...] from a non-client in connection with giving advice to 
the client.’”).  
82  Id. at 859.  
83  Id. at 859. 
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$ 1 million investment threshold to be eligible for the success fee-is a contingent financial incentive, 
an investment threshold incentive not designed to deliver a payment but only to qualify the adviser 
for a potential payment (the success fee). Vernazza’s holding that a contingent financial incentive is 
an economic benefit provides support for viewing an investment adviser’s unrealized investment 
performance fee84 as an economic benefit that would satisfy the compensation element.  
Similarly, the case of SEC v. Tandem Management, Inc. supports this economic benefit approach.85 In 
this enforcement action, the court held that an investment adviser violated, among other provi-
sions, § 207 by failing to disclose on its Form ADV certain “soft dollar” arrangements. Under § 28(e)86 
of the Exchange Act, soft dollar arrangements between investment advisers and broker-dealers 
permit the adviser to place securities trades on behalf of investment adviser clients with the broker-
dealer at a commission rate higher than the lowest rate available, if the broker-dealer is providing 
the adviser with certain investment research or other permissible “soft dollar” benefits.87 As is typi-
cal with most brokerage arrangements, the investment adviser client, not the investment adviser, 
pays for the brokerage commission on trades placed on the client’s own behalf. Here, the court 
found that the adviser engaged in several undisclosed fraudulent schemes to profit from abusing 
its soft dollar arrangements. These included permitting a broker-dealer to charge investment advis-
er clients excessively high brokerage commissions in return for investment research and then re-
quiring the broker-dealer to kick back half of the excessive brokerage commission to the adviser.  
Tandem Management’s holding that undisclosed kickbacks of client commission brokerage payments 
constitute an economic benefit supports Ogale’s holding that misappropriated client funds are an 
economic benefit that meets the compensation element. The client of Tandem Management paid an 
excessively higher brokerage commission, more than the amount permitted under a disclosed soft 
dollar arrangement. The amount of the commission paid in excess of the disclosed soft dollar ar-
                                                
84  Under certain terms and conditions, see, e.g., § 205, Investment Advisory Contracts, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5, and Rule 205-3, 
Exemption from the Compensation Prohibition of Section 205(a)(1) for Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 275.5-3, an 
investment adviser may charge a client an investment performance fee, which, essentially, is based on amount 
of gains, if any, resulting from the adviser’s investment advice. If the investment advice achieves adequate in-
vestment gains to trigger payment by the client of the investment performance fee, the investment performance 
fee is “realized.” If the investment adviser fails to achieve adequate gains to trigger the payment by the client of 
the investment performance fee, it is “unrealized.” When an investment performance fee is “unrealized” the cli-
ent does not pay the adviser an investment performance fee. It remains “unrealized” until the investment advice 
creates an adequate gain. Courts have not resolved whether an unrealized investment performance fee satisfies 
the compensation element. See Fife v. SEC, 311 F.3d. 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2002) (a Commission enforcement action 
where the court held, without explanation, that the compensation element was met, in part by finding that the 
adviser “understood” he would be compensated by receiving a percentage of investment profits “if successful, 
pursuant to a formula to be agreed upon at a later time.”) (italics in original); but see U.S. v. Regensberg, 635 F. 
Supp. 2d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d 381 F. App’x 60 (2d Cir. 2010) (a criminal appeal, the district court held, without 
explanation, that a contractual right to receive a contingent performance fee without actually meeting the condi-
tions to receive the fee, did not constitute compensation under § 202(a)(11)). 
85  2001 WL 1488218 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
86  Effect on Existing Law, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e). 
87  See, e.g., Amendments to Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3060 (July 28, 2010) n.126, 75 FR 49234 
(Aug. 12, 2010) (adopting rule release) (“Under Section 28(e) [of the Exchange Act], a person who exercises in-
vestment discretion over a client account has not acted unlawfully or breached a fiduciary duty solely by causing 
the account to pay more than the lowest commission rate available, so long as that person determines in good 
faith that the commission amount is reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and research services 
provided. […] Section 28(e) […] provides a limited ‘safe harbor’ for [investment] advisers with discretionary authority 
in connection with their receipt of soft dollar benefits. […] Advisers must disclose their receipt of soft dollar bene-
fits to clients, regardless of whether the benefits fall inside or outside of the safe harbor.”); see also Interpretive 
Release Concerning the Scope of Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Related Matters, Ex-
change Act Release No. 23170 (Apr. 23, 1986), 51 FR 16004 (Apr. 30, 1986).   
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rangement was arguably “misappropriated” from the client by the broker, who kicked back a por-
tion of these “misappropriated” client funds to the investment adviser. These client funds paid to 
the investment adviser constituted an economic benefit that should have been disclosed. This  
analysis lends support to Ogale’s broader view that “misappropriated” client funds are an economic 
benefit that satisfies the compensation element.88  
In addition to § 207, other provisions of United States federal securities laws implicate an economic 
benefit approach to determine whether a compensation requirement is met. For example, an eco-
nomic benefit approach was used to determine whether an employee of a securities issuer was 
compensated for participating in an unregistered, public securities offering in violation of § 5 of the 
Securities Act.89 Also, in interpreting § 15(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,90 the compan-
ion legislation to the Advisers Act, at least one court has applied an economic benefit approach to 
determine whether inappropriate compensation was paid to an investment adviser under contract 
with an investment company.91 The economic benefit concept is also used to determine whether a 
security has been created.92 In further developing the compensation element of § 202(a)(11), courts 
may find useful these examples of the application of an economic benefit approach in United States 
federal securities laws.   
3. Another Way to Approach Compensation: Contract Analysis 
Taking a step back from the economic benefit approach, the language and structure of the Advis-
ers Act also supports viewing compensation within a contractual framework. Like other profes-
sional services providers, an adviser typically enters into a contract that establishes what services 
are to be provided and the compensation to be paid for those services. Consistent with this prac-
tice, the Advisers Act contemplates that a contract between the investment adviser and client will 
be formed.93 Indeed, the Advisers Act specifically regulates the content of an advisory contract,94 
                                                
88  Both Vernazza and Tandem Management are enforcement actions alleging violations of § 207, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7, 
based on the economic benefit disclosure requirements of Form ADV. One of the purposes of Form ADV’s economic 
benefit language, however, is to compel disclosure of investment adviser conflicts of interest, a goal arguably requir-
ing a broader view of economic benefit than traditional notions of compensation in professional service relation-
ships. See generally Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 190 (1963) (discussing actu-
al and potential conflicts of interest arising from investment adviser’s undisclosed “economic self-interest”).   
89  Prohibitions Relating to Interstate Commerce and the Mails, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012). See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. 
Phan, 500 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007) (receipt of an economic benefit by issuer employees for sale or distribution of 
securities relevant in determining whether a violation of Securities Act § 5 occurred); see also Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. Solomon Inc., 1995 WL 412429 (S.D.N.Y 1995) (economic benefit of ownership of securities in prear-
ranged, sham transactions), vacated on other grounds by 78 F.3d 802 (2d Cir. 1996); Securities Act § 17(b), Fraudu-
lent Interstate Transactions, 15 U.S.C. § 77q, (undisclosed compensation paid to stock touter of securities is ele-
ment of violation of Securities Act § 17(b)). 
90  Investment Company Act § 15(a), Contracts of Advisers and Underwriters, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a).  
91  Steadman v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying economic benefit approach in holding 
that interest fee loan to adviser qualified as compensation under Investment Company Act § 15(a)(1)).    
92  See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Kirkland, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (economic benefit relevant in 
determining if an investment contract meets the definition of a security). 
93  See, e.g., § 201(1), Findings, 15 U.S.C.§ 80b-1(1) (“[I]nvestment advisers are of national concern, [...] their [...] con-
tacts [...] with clients are negotiated and performed, by the use of the mails and means and instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce [...].”); § 205(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(d) (defines for certain purpose an investment advisory 
contract as “any contract or agreement whereby a person agrees to act as investment adviser to or to manage 
any investment or trading account of another person other than an investment company registered under title I 
of this Act [Advisers Act]”). 
94  See, e.g., § 205(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(3) (requires that an investment advisory contract includes a provision 
requiring an investment adviser organized as a partnership to notify the client of any change in membership of 
the partnership).  
ALJ 1/2015 Observations on Judicial Approaches to Discerning Investment Adviser Status 113 
 
conditions for assigning the advisory contract,95 and limitations on contractual waiver of certain 
rights under the Advisers Act.96 Section 205 authorizes and regulates the circumstances under 
which an investment advisory contract may permit an adviser to receive a performance-based 
fee.97 In addition, certain Commission rules promulgated under § 203 rely on the date the advi-
sory contract is executed98 as the trigger for requiring delivery of Form ADV (or its equivalent) 
to a client. Written advisory contracts must be maintained as a record available for Commis-
sion examination.99 Under § 215, a private client action against an investment adviser requires 
that a contract be formed between the client and the investment adviser100 and limits standing 
to initiate an action to the parties to the contract.101 Based in part on these provisions, the 
contract analysis approach is consistent with cannons of statutory construction requiring that 
every provision of a statute be given effect102 and, at least initially, both language itself along 
with the specific context used and broader context of the statute as a whole103 be considered. 
A contract analysis approach would build on this statutorily created contract framework. The 
essential inquiry would focus on whether an advisory contract was formed between the advis-
er and the client. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Transamerica Mortgage Advi-
sors, Inc. v. Lewis,104 this inquiry will be guided by the application of state law concepts of contract  
 
 
                                                
95  See § 205(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(2) (prohibits assignment of an investment advisory contract without the 
consent of the other party to the contract); see also § 202(a)(1), Assignment, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1); Rule 
202(a)(1)-1, Certain Transactions Not Deemed Assignments, 17 C.F.R. § 275.2(a)(1)-1.  
96  See § 215, Validity of Contracts, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (limits waiver of provisions of the Advisers Act in invest-
ment advisory contracts).  
97  15 U.S.C. § 80b-5. 
98  Rule 204-3(b), Delivery of Brochures and Brochure Supplements, 17 C.F.R. § 275.3(b) (requires an investment 
adviser provide Form ADV to a client at least forty eight hours before entering into an investment advisory 
contract or, if not provided forty eight hours before entering into a contract, the client is permitted, without 
charge, to terminate the contract within five days of entering into the contract).  
99  Rule 204-2(a)(10), Books and Records to Be Maintained by Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 275.4-2(a)(10) 
(requiring written agreements between an investment adviser and a client be maintained). 
100  See, e.g., Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979).  
101  See id. § 214, Jurisdiction of Offenses and Suits, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14; § 215, Validity of Contracts, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
15; see also Clark v. Nevis Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2005 WL 488641 1, 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Only parties to an in-
vestment advisory contract may sue for rescission under section 215. See Zurich Capital Markets, Inc. v. 
Coglianese, 332 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1114 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (‘In order to sue under the Act and seek rescission of 
the contract, [a plaintiff investor] must be a party to the contract.’) (citing Shahidi v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., No. 2:02CV483FTM29SC, 2003 WL 21488228, at 3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2003) (concluding that 
the plaintiff ‘shareholders have no standing to individually sue either defendant in this case to void the con-
tracts’); Soderberg v. Gens, 652 F. Supp. 560, 564 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (observing that the courts limit claims to ‘per-
sons actually in an advise/client relationship’)); Neely v. Bar Harbor Bankshares, 240 F. Supp. 2d 44, 49 (D. Me. 
2003) (observing that ‘there is no right of action under the Act unless there is first an investment adviser con-
tract between the parties’) (citing Paul S. Mullin & Assoc., Inc. v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 532, 537 (D. Del. 1986) 
(stating that ‘only the parties to [an investment adviser] contract can avail themselves of the remedy of rescis-
sion’)); Washington, 656 F. Supp. at 1178 (holding that only parties to an investment adviser contract are 
proper parties in a claim brought under section 215).”).   
102  Corley v. U.S., 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quotations omitted) (Under this “most basic [of] interpretative can-
nons [...] [a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all of its provisions, so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant [...].”). But see Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S.Ct. 1166 
(2013) (discussing limitations on application of cannon against surplusage).  
103  Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (citation omitted) (In determining whether statutory lan-
guage has a plain and unambiguous meaning, courts should refer “to the language itself, the specific context 
in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”). 
104  444 U.S. 11 (1979). 
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law105 to the extent consistent with the Advisers Act.106 Depending on the applicable state’s con-
tract law, a wide array of contract theories may be available, including: third-party beneficiary 
status,107 quasi-contract, unilateral contract, estoppel, equitable contract and the like.108 These 
forms of contract provide an ample legal basis for developing this approach. Assuming that a 
contract is formed, the inquiry would then shift to determining whether a legally recognized form 
of compensation was exchanged consistent with the applicable contract theory.   
C. What Constitutes Investment Advice? 
Under § 202(a)(11) investment advice is described as “advising others [...] directly [...] as to the 
value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities [...].”109 
Courts have discussed three types of investment advice without explicitly labeling them. For pur-
poses of this article, these three types of advice are identified as traditional personal advice; allo-
cation, selection and monitoring personal advice; and impersonal advice. As appropriate, some 
observations are offered with this analysis.   
1. Traditional Personal Advice 
Some courts have viewed investment advice as reflecting the personal nature of the relationship 
between an investment adviser and its client. Under this traditional notion of an investment ad-
viser’s role, the adviser questions the client about, among other things, its investment goals, risk 
tolerance, financial needs, and time horizon. Next, consistent with this personal information, the 
adviser tailors an investment strategy and executes it. This personal advice may be offered as 
either advisory, where an investment adviser recommends the purchase or sale of securities to a 
                                                
105  See, e.g., id. at 19 (the court concluded that “[w]hen Congress declared in § 215 that certain contracts are void, it 
intended that the customary legal incidents of voidness would follow, including the availability of a suit or rescission 
or for an injunction against continued operation of the contract, and for restitution.”); id. at 25 n.14 (“Where rescis-
sion is awarded, the rescinding party may of course have restitution of the consideration given under the contract, 
less any value conferred by the other party. See 5 A. Corbin, Contracts § 1114 (1964).”); Wisnieski v. Rodale, 510 F.3d 
294, 305 n.32 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 7 when interpreting meaning of “void” un-
der § 215, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15); Omega Overseas Partners, Ltd. v. Griffith, 2014 WL 3907082 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 20014) (“[…] 
§ 215(b)’s text strongly echoes the description of illegal contracts found in the Restatement of Contracts, which was 
published only a few years before the IAA’s enactment.”); Conrardy v. Ribadeneira, 1990 WL 66603 1, 4 (D. Kan. 
1990). See generally Sekhar v. U.S., 133 S.Ct. 2720, 2724 (2013) (citation omitted) (“[W]here Congress borrows terms 
of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and 
adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was 
taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.”); Carter v. U.S., 530 U.S. 
255, 266 (2000) (“[W]e have not hesitated to turn to the common law for guidance when the relevant statutory text 
does contain a term with an established meaning at common law.”); U.S. v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13 (1994) (“[A]bsent 
contrary indications, Congress intends to adopt the common law definition of statutory terms.”); Miller v. Bridgeport 
Board of Education, 2013 WL 3936925 1, 8 (D. Conn. 2013) (citations omitted) (“The term ‘contract’ pursuant to [42 
U.S.C.] § 1981 adopts its ordinary common law meaning.”).  
106  See § 203A, State and Federal Responsibilities, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3A (addressing division of state and federal re-
sponsibilities for overseeing investment advisers); § 222, State Regulation of Investment Advisers, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-22 
(addressing, inter alia, state responsibilities for regulating investment advisers). 
107  See generally Bayerische Landesbank v. Aladdin Capital Mgmt., LLC, 692 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2012).    
108  To the extent consistent with the Advisers Act, application of state law concepts of contract may be supported by 
other provisions of federal securities laws addressing certain types of compensation contracts and other com-
pensation arrangements. See, e.g., Investment Company Act § 36, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 15 U.S.C. 80a-36, Ex-
change Act § 10C, Compensation Committees, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3; Exchange Act § 14A, Shareholder Approval of Ex-
ecutive Compensation, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1; Regulation S-K, Item 402, Executive Compensation, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402; 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 304, Forfeiture of Certain Bonuses and Profits, Pub.L.107-204, 116 Stat. 745, codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 7243.  
109  § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). 
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client and the client makes the ultimate decision; or discretionary, where the client authorizes an 
investment adviser to make investment decisions to purchase and sell securities on behalf of the 
client without the client first approving of each investment decision.110    
Aspects of this personal one-on-one relationship were relied on by the Supreme Court in SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,111 which held that § 206(2) imposed on an investment adviser 
a fiduciary duty to its client.112 Moreover, the Advisers Act recognizes that some investment ad-
visers offer personal advice, while others do not.113 Investment advisory business models based 
on offering personal advice, either on an advisory or discretionary basis, include individual client 
account management, financial planning services, certain sports and entertainment agent ser-
vices, and certain internet advisory services.114 
2. Allocation, Selection and Monitoring Personal Advice 
Although § 202(a)(11) speaks primarily in terms of advising others on purchasing and selling securi-
ties, in SEC v. Washington Investment Network,115 (“WIN”), an enforcement action, the court recog-
nized as investment advice three different forms of personal advice, which, in varying degrees, 
are removed from the traditional process of selecting securities on behalf of clients. The first 
form of advice focuses on how to allocate client funds among different types of securities invest-
ments, essentially recommending what asset classes to invest in (equities, debt, and the like).116 
The second form of advice is to assist the client in selecting another investment adviser to invest 
client funds consistent with the asset allocation advice. Lastly, the third type of advice provided 
by the adviser is the monitoring of the execution of the asset allocation plan by the selected in-
vestment adviser. In WIN, this monitoring advice included periodically reviewing the investment 
                                                
110  Lowe v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 472 U.S. 181, 191–92 n. 31 (1985) (inter alia, describing advisory and discretionary 
forms of personal investment advice).     
111  375 U.S. 180, 184 (1963). 
112  See id. at 187 n.5, 191 (Court relied in part on the legislative history of the Advisers Act that described the “per-
sonalized counseling,” and “personalized character” of providing investment advice on a “personal basis,” as well 
as describing the relationship between an adviser and client as one of “trust and confidence.”); see also Lowe, 472 
U.S. 181, 192, n.31 (1985) (inter alia, discussing legislative history of the Advisers Act that addresses personal in-
vestment advice, as opposed to impersonal investment advice, in holding that the “bona fide” publication ex-
emption under § 202(a)(11)(D) for Publishing advisers was appropriate when applied to purely impersonal in-
vestment advice).  
113  See § 202(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 2(a)(13), (“‘Investment supervisory services’ means the giving of continuous advice as 
to the investment of funds on the basis of the individual needs of each client.”); § 208(c), General Prohibitions, 15 
U.S.C. § 8(c) (prohibiting use of “investment counsel” as description of investment adviser business unless: “a sub-
stantial part of his or its business consists of rendering investment supervisory services.”); see, e.g., § 203(c)(1)(H), 
Procedures for Registration; Filing of Applications; Effective Date of Registration; Amendment of Registration,  
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c)(1)(H) (“[A] statement as to whether a substantial part of the business of such investment ad-
viser, consists or is to consist of rendering investment supervisory services.”).  
114  Rule 203A-2(e), Exemption from Prohibition on SEC Registration, 17 C.F.R. § 275.3A-2(e) (defines internet invest-
ment adviser as “an investment adviser that provides investment advice to its clients exclusively through an in-
teractive website. […] interactive website means a website in which computer software-based models or applica-
tions provide investment advice to clients based on personal information each client supplies through the web-
site.”); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Terry’s Tips, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 526 (D. Ver. 2006) (investment adviser 
advising client via telephone and e-mail meets definition of investment adviser); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Park, 99 F. 
Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (internet adviser meets definition of investment adviser under § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C.  
§ 80b-2(a)(11)); Exemption for Certain Investment Advisers Operating Through the Internet, Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. 2091 (Dec. 12, 2002), 67 FR 77620-01 (Dec. 18, 2002).  
115  475 F.3d. 392 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
116  Id. at 400 (“[B]ecause [WIN] also advised clients in regard to ‘asset allocation,’ we think WIN’s activities easily fall 
within the Act’s definition of investment adviser.”).  
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returns or losses under each investment class and rebalancing the client’s portfolio consistent with 
the client’s personal investment strategy.117     
The WIN court relied primarily on a factual analysis of each form of advice, including a discussion of 
the investment adviser’s own description of the advice offered, in finding that those forms of advice 
satisfied the investment advice requirement. The court did not resort to an analysis of the Advisers 
Act or judicial interpretations of it. The first form of advice (asset allocation advice) is supported, 
however, by the language and structure of the Advisers Act. Section 202(a)(11) can be viewed as 
including two types of advice: 1) “[T]he advisability of [...] purchasing, or selling securities [...]” and 2) 
“advisability of investing in [...] securities [...].” Here, Congress chose to include the word “investing” 
in addition to the purchasing or selling securities. Invest is defined as “to commit (money) in order 
to earn a financial return.”118 In comparison to the specific acts of purchasing and selling, invest is a 
more general term that focuses on the initial decision to commit money, which could lead to pur-
chasing and selling securities or some other means of earning a financial return. Arguably, asset 
allocation advice is a form of investing advice that is, in the context of the Advisers Act,119 a precur-
sor to purchasing and selling securities. Similarly, to the extent that the third form of advice (moni-
toring advice) represents an ongoing obligation to reallocate client investment funds among assets 
classes, it is arguably a continuous form of “investing,” as interpreted under allocation advice.   
The most developed analysis offered by the WIN court focused on the third form of advice, referred 
to here as manager selection advice: “WIN’s business of selecting particular investment managers in 
lieu of others had the effect of channeling client funds to particular security investments.”120 Here, 
the WIN court’s reliance on the “effect of channeling” client funds to securities investments is sup-
ported by the statutory interpretation of the word “investing” as discussed above. In WIN, the court 
took a significant step in recognizing asset allocation, monitoring and manager selection advice as 
investment advice, a view long held by the Commission.121  
 3. Impersonal Advice 
Abrahamson v. Fleschner,122 is the seminal case in establishing impersonal advice as satisfying 
§ 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11).123 In Abrahamson, an investment partnership was formed to 
                                                
117  Id. at 399–400. But see Pozez v. Ethanol Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2009 WL 2176574 (D. Ariz. 2009) (rejecting insufficient 
monitoring activities as providing investment advice under Report Adviser definition of an investment adviser). 
118  WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 636 (9th ed. 1985).  
119  Under § 205(d), Investment Advisory Contracts, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(d), the definition of an investment advisory con-
tract includes “to manage any investment [...] of another person [...].” In turn, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 865 (5th ed. 
1979) defines “manage,” as among other things: “To control and direct, to administer, to take charge of.” The use of 
the word “manage” under § 205(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(d), supports interpreting “the advisability of investing” language 
of § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11), as including asset allocation advice.   
120  475 F.3d. at 400.  
121  Rule 203A-2(a), Pension Consultants, 17 C.F.R. § 275.3A-2(a) (defining investment advice provided by an investment 
adviser acting as a pension consultant as “including any advice with respect to the selection of an investment advis-
er to manage such [employee benefit plan] assets.”); see SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT CONCERNING EXAMINATION OF 
SELECTED PENSION CONSULTANTS, THE OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS (May 16, 2005); see also Rule 204-
3(h)(5), Delivery of Brochures and Brochure Supplements, 17 C.F.R. § 275.4-3(h)(5) (“Wrap Fee program means an 
advisory program under which a specified fee or fees not based directly upon transactions in a client’s account is 
charged for investment advisory services (which may include portfolio management or advice concerning the selec-
tion of other investment advisers) and the execution of client transactions.”); SEC Release 1092.  
122  568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). 
123  Abrahamson, 568 F.2d at 870–71 (analysis of investment advice is couched in terms of the “engaged in the business” 
element of § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)). 
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raise capital by selling limited partnership interests in the partnership to investors. The capital 
held by the partnership was invested by the general partners in securities, consistent with a con-
servative investment policy. The general partners were authorized to decide what securities to 
purchase, hold and sell, while the limited partners did not participate in investing in securities. 
The general partners were compensated primarily124 by receiving a percentage of the profits and 
net capital gains earned by the investment partnership.   
In Abrahamson, the court held that the general partners provided investment advice because they 
were charged with “exercising control over what purchases and sales are made with their clients’ 
funds.”125 In support of its interpretation, the court relied on the plain language of § 202(a)(11),  
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11),126 the statutory structure of the Advisers Act,127 and the legislative in-
tent128 and “broad remedial purposes of the Act.”129    
Supported by this analysis, Abrahamson has proven to be noteworthy because it held that an 
adviser providing impersonal advice to an investment partnership under discretionary authority 
satisfies the investment advice element.130 Under this form of impersonal investment advice, the 
advice need not be tailored to an individual investor’s needs (like personal advice), but is provid-
ed directly to the investment partnership, which typically explains its investment strategy to po-
tential investors and leaves it to them to decide whether investing in the partnership is appropri-
ate.131 It stands in contrast to the traditional personal advice approach with an adviser providing 
                                                
124  See id. at 870 (“In addition, the partnership agreement of October 1, 1968, provided for an annual salary of $ 25,000 
for each general partner who managed the partnership’s investments.”).   
125  See id. at 871 (in addition to finding managing investment partnership securities to be investment advice, court 
noted that adviser provided limited partner investors with a monthly report stating the percentage increase or 
decrease in value of the investment partnership holding and compared this performance with Standard and 
Poor 500 stock average, consistent with Report Adviser language of § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11); see also, 
Sec. & Exch. Comm. v. Saltzman, 127 F. Supp. 2d 660, 669–70 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (applying Abrahamson in holding 
that adviser sending limited partnership investors a copy of investment fund financial statements constituted a 
report under § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)).  
126  Abrahamson, 568 F.2d at 871. 
127  Id. (The court looked to § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3, requiring disclosure of an adviser’s authority over client funds, 
and § 205, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5, setting standards for advisory contracts governing an adviser managing “investments 
or trading accounts.”).  
128  Id. at 870-71 (The court in Abrahamson reviewed numerous congressional committee reports, for example, Re-
port of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, reflecting that the Advisers Act was intended to cover 
persons investing client funds, including “pools of liquid funds of the public.”).  
129  Id. at 870. Since the Abrahamson decision was issued in 1968, the traditional cannon of statutory interpretation 
that remedial statutes should be construed liberally has been criticized. See Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 885 F. Supp. 2d 429, 440 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Antonin Scalia, Assorted Cannards of Contemporary Legal Analy-
sis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 581-82 (1990)) (In discussing remedial statute cannon: “Justice Scalia describes this 
cannon as ‘surely among the prime examples of lego-babble.’”).  
130  See, e.g., U.S. v. Elliott, 62 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying Abrahamson to definition of investment ad-
viser); Wang v. Gordon, 715 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying Abrahamson to definition of investment adviser); 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Montana, 2005 WL 645143 1, 2 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (applying Abrahamson to definition of in-
vestment adviser); Saltzman, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 669-70 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (applying Abrahamson to definition of in-
vestment adviser); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Smith, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22352 (Jan. 6, 1995) (applying Abrahamson 
to definition of investment adviser).    
131  See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Goldstein, 451 F.3d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“As recently as 1997, it [SEC] explained 
that a ‘client of an investment adviser typically is provided with individualized advice that is based on the client’s 
financial situation and investment objectives. In contrast, the investment adviser of an investment company 
need not consider the individual needs of the company’s shareholders when making investment decisions, and 
thus has no obligation to ensure that each security purchased for the company’s portfolio is an appropriate in-
vestment for each shareholder.’ Status of Investment Advisory Programs Under the Investment Company Act of 
1940, 62 Fed.Reg. 15,098, 15,102 (Mar. 31, 1997).”); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Mannion, 2013 WL 5999657 1, 3 (N.D. 
Ga. 2013) (“In Goldstein, the court explained that, generally, a hedge fund manager’s client is the hedge fund it-
self, and not the investors in the fund.”). Commission rules promulgated under the Advisers Act reflect this con-
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one-on-one personal advice with its client. Abrahamson provides legal analysis to support applica-
tion of § 202(a)(11) to a wide range of advisers offering impersonal advice as sub-advisers,132 advis-
ers participating in wrap fee programs,133 and advisers to certain private investment funds134 and 
collateralized debt obligations.135 
D. The Relationship between Investment Advice and Compensation:  
The Intertwined Purposes Issue 
The structure of § 202(a)(11) requires that an investment adviser be compensated for investment 
advice. In Elliott the court held that discrete fee for investment advice need not be paid in order 
to meet the compensation element. The ambiguity created by permitting payment for unspeci-
fied services, however, has forced courts to unravel the intertwined purposes issue: whether 
compensation is paid for investment advice, as opposed to some other type of advice or service 
that is intertwined with investment advice. In addressing this intertwined purposes issue under 
§ 202(a)(11), two different approaches have emerged: the “Purpose of the Partnership” and the 
“Primary v. Incidental” approaches.  
 
                                                                                                                                    
cept of impersonal advice. See, e.g., Rule 203A-3(a)(3)(ii), Definitions, 17 C.F.R. § 275.3A-3(a)(3)(ii) (“‘Impersonal in-
vestment advice’ means investment advisory services provided by means of written material or oral statements 
that do not purport to meet the objectives or needs of specific individuals or accounts.”); Rule 204-3(h)(1), Deliv-
ery of Brochures and Brochure Supplement, 17 C.F.R. § 275.4-3(h)(1) (“Impersonal investment advice means in-
vestment advisory services that do not purport to meet the objectives or needs of specific individuals or ac-
counts.”); Rule 206(4)-3(d)(3), Cash Payments for Client Solicitations, 17 C.F.R. § 275.6(4)-3(d)(3) (“Impersonal advi-
sory services means investment advisory services provided solely by means of (i) written materials or oral state-
ments which do not purport to meet the objectives or needs of the specific client […].”). 
132  See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Treadway, 430 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (investment adviser as sub-adviser); see 
also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Press Release, SEC, PIMCO equity Mutual Funds’ Adviser, Sub-Adviser, and Distributor 
Agree to Pay $ 50 Million to Settle Fraud Charges for Undisclosed Market Timing, No. 2004-127 (Sept. 13, 2004). 
133  Rule 204-3(h)(5), Delivery of Brochures and Brochure Supplements, 17 C.F.R. § 275.4-3(h)(5), (“Wrap fee program 
means an advisory program under which a specified fee or fees not based directly upon transactions in a client’s 
account is charged for investment advisory services (which may include portfolio management or advice con-
cerning the selection of other investment advisers) and the execution of client transactions.”); Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. Washington Investment Network, 475 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing wrap fee program struc-
ture); Geman v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 334 F.3d 1183, 1185-86 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Under the wrap fee program, the 
firm’s customers paid an ‘all-inclusive’ fee calculated as a percentage of the customer’s assets under manage-
ment. In return, the firm provided brokerage, advisory, and custodial services.”); see also Disclosure by Invest-
ment Advisers Regarding Wrap Fee Programs, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1411 (Apr. 19, 1994), 59 FR 
21657 (Apr. 26, 1994) (adopting rule release).  
134  See generally Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and 
Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3308 (Oct. 31, 2011), 76 FR 71128 
(Nov. 16, 2011); Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less Than $ 150 
Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3222 
(June 22, 2011), 76 FR 39646 (July 6, 2011); STAFF OF THE DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, ANNUAL STAFF REPORT RELATING TO THE USE OF DATA COLLECTED FROM PRIVATE FUND SYSTEMIC RISK REPORTS 6 (July 
25, 2013) (listing private funds filing with the Commission under Form PF (private fund): hedge funds, private equity 
funds, other private funds, real estate funds, securities asset funds, venture capital funds and liquidity funds).  
135  The Commission has initiated enforcement actions against investment advisers serving as collateral managers 
for collateralized debt obligations. See, e.g., In the Matter of Harding Advisory LLC and Wing F. Chau, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 3696, 2913 WL 5670841 (Oct. 18, 2013) (order instituting enforcement action alleging 
investment adviser serving as collateral manager violated, inter alia, § 206); In the Matter of Delaware Asset Ad-
visers and Wei, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3434, 104 S.E.C. Docket 651 (July 18, 2012) (settled enforce-
ment action) (investment adviser serving as collateral manager and then portfolio manager found to have violated, 
inter alia, § 206(2)); In the Matter of GSCP (NJ), LP, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3261101, S.E.C. Docket 
3325 (Aug. 25, 2011) (settled enforcement action) (investment adviser serving as collateral manager found to 
have violated, inter alia, § 206(2)).    
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1. The Purpose of the Partnership 
In Wang v. Gordon,136 a private action, the defendant was a general partner to a limited partnership 
formed to own and operate an apartment building. The terms of the partnership agreement entitled 
the defendant to a five percent brokerage commission upon the sale of the apartment building, 
which he eventually received. The plaintiff was unsatisfied with the sale and sought relief under the 
Advisers Act. Plaintiff argued, among other things, that the defendant acted as an investment advis-
er in arranging for the sale of the apartment building. As part of the transaction, the defendant sent 
a letter to limited partnership investors outlining the terms of the sale. Because the apartment 
building was held by a limited partnership, plaintiff reasoned, the sale of the building would require 
the sale of securities, the limited partnership interests held by the limited partners. Plaintiff argued 
that the defendant’s letter constituted investment advice concerning the sale of the building and, 
concomitantly, the securities (the limited partnership interests) required to transact the sale. Plain-
tiff contended that the defendant was compensated to this advice by receiving the five percent 
commission payment.  
In rejecting plaintiff’s argument, the Wang court found that the defendant was compensated for his 
advice concerning the sale of the apartment building, not the sale of the limited partnership inter-
ests. In making this determination, the court looked to the “purpose of the partnership”137 to decide 
whether the advice satisfied the investment advice element. It distinguished the purpose of the real 
estate partnership at issue from the investment partnership discussed in Abrahamson. The Wang 
court viewed the “purpose of the partnership” in Abrahamson as advising on purchasing or selling 
securities for a limited partnership, which constituted investment advice. In contrast, the “purpose 
of the partnership” in Wang was to own and operate a building, not securities. The defendant had 
arranged the sale of a partnership asset, an apartment building, not a security, and therefore was 
not compensated for providing investment advice. Under Wang, the “purpose of the partnership” 
dictated the purpose of the compensation paid to the defendant.    
In creating this “purpose of the partnership” approach to resolve the intertwined purposes issue, 
the court in Wang provides no guidance on how to determine this purpose or how to resolve com-
peting purposes. For example, though investment partnerships typically state their purpose in lim-
ited partnership offering documents,138 the activities of the partnership may diverge substantially 
from its stated purpose. In its simplest form, an investment partnership may state that its purpose 
is to invest in commodities, which are not a security, but instead it may invest in securities, ultimate-
ly satisfying the definition of an investment adviser. Indeed, courts have emphasized that it is not 
the description of a business that determines whether it falls within the definition of an investment 
adviser, but the actual business conduct.139 On balance, the “purpose of the partnership” has 
gained no judicial support. 
                                                
136  715 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1983). 
137  Id. at 1192. 
138  Generally, in a non-public securities offering under Securities Act § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. 77a(d)(a)(2), the issuer of the 
securities may circulate privately among qualified, prospective investors offering documents explaining, inter alia, 
the securities offering, including the nature of the investment opportunity. These documents are known as a Private 
Placement Memorandum, Private Offering Memorandum, or some other non-public offering document. These doc-
uments, however, are generally the responsibility of the general partner, who may be a legal entity separate from 
the investment adviser.   
139  See, e.g., U.S. v. Onsa, 523 Fed. App’x 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2013) (in upholding enhanced sentence based on investment 
adviser status, court held that defendant having “explicitly told investors that he was not an ‘investment adviser’ un-
der the [Advisers] Act” did not affect defendant’s investment adviser status); see also Fresenius Medical Care Hold-
ings v. U.S., 763 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2014) (In tax cases, courts “look to the substance – that is, the economic reality of 
the particular transaction, objectively viewed – rather than to the form chosen by the parties.”).    
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2. Primary v. Incidental 
In U.S v. Elliott,140 the defendants argued that they, like the defendant in Wang, had not received 
compensation for investment advice. They claimed that clients came to them to purchase a securi-
ty, an investment vehicle created by the defendants, not to receive investment advice. In rejecting 
defendants’ argument, the court held that investment advice to clients constituted a “significant 
component of the ‘product’ sold.”141 The defendants in Elliott assisted clients in “choosing individ-
ually tailored investment vehicles.”142 Next, it noted that after providing advice about the invest-
ment selection, the defendants continued to advise the clients by managing the underlying in-
vestments. The court held that these two forms of advice – the assistance in choosing an invest-
ment vehicle and management of the underlying investments held by the investment vehicle – 
were the “primary,” not “incidental” reasons for investing in the investment vehicles. This primary 
role of the advice in making a decision to invest met the investment advice element.   
While Elliott’s “primary v. incidental” approach was helpful in distinguishing Wang,143 Elliott did not 
offer a standard to measure primary as opposed to incidental advice. In Thomas v. Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company,144 a private action, however, the court adopted a standard to measure 
“solely incident” conduct under the § 202(a)(11)(C) broker-dealer exception to the definition of an 
investment adviser. As discussed, under this exception, a broker-dealer may offer investment 
advice that is “solely incident to” its broker-dealer services and may not receive “special compen-
sation” for this advice.145 In Thomas, the court noted that 
the word “incidental” has two components. To be considered incidental, two actions or objects 
must be related in a particular way – the incidental action or object must occur only as a result of 
or in connection with the primary. Additionally, the incidental action or object must be secondary 
in size or importance to the primary.146   
Thomas’ approach to distinguishing between primary and incidental services may assist in devel-
oping Elliott’s distinction between primary and incidental advice. 
E. Advising Others 
Section 202(a)(11) requires that an adviser be engaged in advising “others.” Typically, the adviser’s 
client is the recipient of the adviser’s advice and this would satisfy that the advice had been pro-
vided to “others.” In interpreting this advising “others” language, courts have addressed two issues: 
1) whether the person receiving the investment advice must be in a position to act on the advice;147 
and 2) whether a trustee’s investment advice to a trust is advice to itself or “others.”   
                                                
140  62 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 1996), order amending opinion, 82 F.3d 989 (11th Cir. 1996). 
141  Id. at 1311. 
142  Id.    
143  See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Saltzman, 127 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (distinguishing application of Wang v. 
Gordon, 715 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1983)).  
144  631 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2011). 
145  In addition to § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C.§ 80b-2(a)(11)(C), § 202(a)(11)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(B), exempts lawyers, 
accountants, engineers and teachers who offer investment advice that is “solely incidental.”    
146  Thomas, 631 F.3d at 1162. 
147  Some courts have held that the advice element is satisfied if an adviser provides advice regardless of whether 
the advice is acted upon. See, e.g., U.S. v. Elia, 2014 WL 4289389 2 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“It [§ 202(a)(11), 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)] does not require that the adviser actually make an investment or act on that advice.”); see 
also U.S. v. Olga, 378 F. App’x 959, 960 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“Although Ogale never actually used inves-
tors’ money to trade foreign currencies, his scheme involved ‘advising others.’”). 
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1. An Opportunity to Act by the Recipient of Investment Advice 
The Wang decision also raised an issue of whether the recipient of advice must be in a position to 
act on that advice. As noted, Wang argued that by the defendant sending a letter to limited part-
nership investors outlining the sales terms of the property, he provided investment advice. In 
rejecting this argument, the court relied, in part, on its conclusion that Wang, as a limited partner, 
“had no input or say as to the sale [of the apartment building]”148 by the limited partnership and 
his “inability to participate”149 in the decision to sell meant that the advice was not investment 
advice. This “inability to participate” limitation on the advising “others” element, strongly implies 
that Wang as the recipient of the advice must be in a position to participate in the decision to sell 
the property for the advice to meet the requirements of § 202(a)(11).  
An ability to participate in certain business decisions may run afoul of United States federal secu-
rities laws. A requirement that a holder of a security (Wang as a limited partner) must participate 
in the business affairs of the issuer of securities (the limited partnership) may contradict the defi-
nition of a security. In 1945, the Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey,150 held that an investment 
contract may meet the definition of a security if, among other requirements, an investor is “led to 
expect profits solely from the effort of the promoter or a third party.”151 More recently, in devel-
oping this requirement, courts have not only made a distinction between passive investor con-
duct and significant investor control,152 but, in determining whether a limited partnership interest 
is a security, have required that the relevant partnership agreement give the general partner the 
“exclusive right and power to manage, conduct, and operate [...]” the partnership’s business.153 
To the extent that Wang is required to participate in investment decisions of a partnership, Wang 
jeopardizes the limited partnership interest meeting the requirements of a security.   
2. The Trustee Conundrum – Is Advising “Yourself” Advising Others? 
Given the legal relationship between a trustee and the trust, courts have struggled over whether 
trustee investment advice to a trust constitutes advice to itself or to another entity. By way of back-
ground, in 1942, the Commission granted an application of Augustus P. Loring, Jr. requesting an 
order, pursuant to then § 202(a)(11)(F),154 exempting him from the definition of an investment adviser. 
After a public hearing, the Commission concluded that Mr. Loring served as a professional trustee 
in the administration of trusts and estates and the management of property. The vast majority of 
Loring’s business155 consisted of acting as a court appointed fiduciary (a trustee, guardian, conser-
vator or executor) under court supervision. Loring administered both personal and real property. 
When acting under court appointment, he held legal title to the property and acts as a principal.156 
                                                
148  715 F.2d at 1192. 
149  Id.  
150  Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (multiple factor tests for determining whether an in-
vestment contract meets the definition of a security).   
151  Id. at 298–99. 
152  Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Aqua-Sonic Products Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1982).  
153  Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Rabinovich & Associates, LP, 2008 WL 4937360 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citations omitted); see, 
e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Northshore Asset Mgmt., 2008 WL 1968299 1, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  
154  Since the Commission issued its order In the Matter of Augustus P. Loring, Jr. in 1942, § 202(a)(11)(F), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80b-2(a)(11)(F), has been renumbered as § 202(a)(11)(G), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(G).  
155  Loring also provided trustee services under trust indenture appointment and power of attorney arrangements. 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 33, 1942 WL 34539 1 (July 22, 1942). 
156  Id. at 2. 
ALJ 1/2015 Brian Carroll 122 
 
As a court fiduciary, Loring was required to give a “bond of acceptance for each trust” in an amount 
sufficient to protect the property, which is discharged after filings accounts with the court.157 Lor-
ing’s activities outside of court supervision but under power of attorney, constituted “only a minor 
part of his business and are, in effect, incidental to his business of acting as a trustee.”158 At the 
close of its order, the Commission noted that Loring neither solicited business, nor held himself out 
to the public as being engaged in the business of providing investment advice. Any advice given to 
others “as to securities” was “solely incidental to his activity as a professional trustee.”159 
In Selzer v. Bank of Bermuda,160 a private action, a beneficiary to an investment trust managed by 
defendant Bank of Bermuda alleged that while acting as a trustee the Bank of Bermuda met the 
definition of an investment adviser and violated the Advisers Act. The court summarily noted that 
the Commission in In re Loring held that a trustee is not an investment adviser. It went on to explain 
that historically a trustee is the legal owner of the trust corpus and the beneficiary is the equitable 
owner. A trustee acts as a principal in making investment decisions for the trust and, therefore, 
does not provide advice to others.161 Although the court acknowledged that there may be public 
policy reasons in support of trustees operating under the definition of an investment adviser, the 
“common sense”162 meaning of the word “adviser”163 militated against applying the Advisers Act. 
Since Selzer, the Commission’s staff has expressed in No-Action Letters164 its disagreement with the 
Selzer court’s characterization of In re Loring and its broad holding that a trustee is does not meet 
the definition of an investment adviser.165  
The Selzer court’s approach to the trustee issue was rejected in SEC v. Smith166, In Smith, an en-
forcement action, a formerly registered investment adviser created a new trust entity and trans-
ferred investment adviser client accounts to it. Smith then restyled his adviser role as one of a 
trustee. Smith argued that under Selzer and In re Loring he was operating as a trustee and, there-
fore, did not meet the definition of an investment adviser. The court in Smith rejected Selzer and 
instead applied the holding in Abrahamson, namely that exercising control over investments con-
stitutes investment advice. Smith noted that the Abrahamson decision was the more cogent deci-
sion and because Abrahamson was an opinion of the circuit court of appeals that Selzer was 
                                                
157  Id. at 1. 
158  Id. at 2. 
159  Id.  
160  385 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
161  Id. at 420; see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ficeto, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (defendant unsuccessfully argued 
that it served as the investment adviser to investment funds that it sponsored and therefore could not defraud itself).  
162  Selzer, 385 F. Supp. at 420. 
163  Id.  
164  Commission staff will provide informal written advice – in the form of a No-Action Letter – in response to a letter 
providing specific facts and representations about an unresolved securities regulation issue. In its No-Action Letter, 
the Commission staff will state whether, under the facts and representations presented, it would or would not 
recommend any Commission enforcement action. See Procedures Applicable to Requests for No-Action and Inter-
pretative Letters, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 281 (Feb. 8, 1971). 
165  These Commission staff positions are reflected in various No-Action Letters. See, e.g., Clair H. Spring (pub. avail. 
Sept. 13, 1990) (“In Selzer, et al. v. The Bank of Bermuda, 385 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (enclosed), the district 
court held that a trustee, acting as legal owner of a trust and principal, is not an adviser with the meaning of Sec-
tion 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. However, in [No-Action Letter] Joseph J. Nameth, Jr. (pub. 
avail. Jan. 31, 1983) (enclosed), the [Sec. & Exch. Comm’n] Division of Investment Management specifically disa-
greed with the district court’s holding in Selzer because it rested on a misreading of an earlier SEC decision (In re 
Loring, 11 S.E.C. 885 (1942)). The Division’s position, as reflected in our no-action letters, has not changed on this 
issue.”). 
166  1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22352 (E.D. Mich.). 
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charged with following,167 it undercut Selzer’s precedential value, a view shared by at least one 
other court.168  
Importantly, Smith viewed In re Loring’s exclusion of a trustee from the definition of an investment 
adviser as limited to situations where a trustee’s business activities are subject to an alternative 
oversight scheme. It noted that the Commission’s order emphasized that Loring’s trustee activi-
ties were under court supervision and the amount of activities outside this court supervision was 
“incidental.”169 Moreover, Smith noted that the trustee in Selzer was a highly regulated foreign 
bank (Bank of Bermuda), while no similar alternative regulatory structure oversaw the defend-
ant’s activities in Smith.170  
While relying on Abrahamson, Smith did not address the legal-equitable ownership distinction 
relied on by Selzer. Selzer viewed a trustee as advising only itself as the legal owner of the trust 
corpus (securities) and therefore not as an investment adviser, while acknowledging the role of 
beneficiaries as equitable owners of corpus of the trust. As an equitable owner, however, a bene-
ficiary generally has standing to initiate a legal proceeding against a trustee alleging violations of 
the trustee’s fiduciary duty, including challenging the appropriateness of the trustee’s investment 
advice.171 This legal standing, at the very least, recognizes that in the investment advice context 
beneficiaries have a separate legal status from that of the trustee, which supports viewing them 
as recipients of the investment advice for purpose of § 202(a)(11). Moreover, this view is supported 
in part by the court’s holding in SEC v. Montana.172 There, UTA-BVI, Ltd, the trustee, invested the 
trust’s funds of two other trusts, First National Equity Trust and P.K. Trust. In finding that UTA-BVI 
met the definition of an investment adviser, the court relied on relevant trust agreements that 
“[…] identified First National Equity Trust and P.K. Trust as beneficiaries of the trust and provide 
that UTA-BVI would manage the trust funds for the benefit of the beneficiaries.”173 The Montana 
                                                
167  Id. at 19. See also Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 583 (D.S.C. 2014) (“It is axiomatic that a decision of a circuit 
court, not overruled by the United States Supreme Court, is controlling precedent for the district courts within 
the circuit.”); Cartica Management, LLC v. Corpbanca, S.A., 2014 WL 4804491 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 6 (“District courts 
and other inferior courts are bound by decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the appropriate circuit unless 
overturned by an intervening Supreme Court decision or other change in the law.”).  
168  See Sec. & Exch. Commn’n v. Montana, 2005 WL 645143 1-2 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (court, without noting either In re 
Loring or Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Smith, held that under Abrahamson, a “trust management agreement” with a 
trustee investing trust funds met the definition of an investment adviser, without making a distinction between 
beneficial and legal ownership of the trust corpus).  
169  1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22352 (E.D. Mich.) 18.  
170  The presence of an alternative oversight authority scheme plays a role determining whether an instrument 
meets the definition of a security. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. J.T. Wal-
lenbrock, 313 F.3d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[F]our Reves factors [...]: (4) whether some factor such as the exist-
ence of another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument […].”); Stober v. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, 161 F. 3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting other Supreme Court cases holding that the regulatory schemes 
imposed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Comptroller of the Currency met alternative regula-
tory scheme requirements under Reves’ fourth factor); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Smart, 2011 WL 2297659 (D. Utah 
2011) (noting Reves’ fourth factor as including alternative regulatory scheme); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Novu 
Techs., LLC, 2010 WL 4180550 (D. Utah 2010) (same); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Global Telecom Servs., LLC, 325 F. 
Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004) (same); see also Inv. Co. Inst. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 720 F.3d 370 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (discussing Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s authority to exclude “otherwise regulated” 
entities from its regulations).   
171  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS: REMEDYING BREACH OF TRUST: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 94 (2012), (“(1) A suit 
against a trustee of a private trust to enjoin or redress a breach of trust or otherwise to enforce the trust may be 
maintained by only a beneficiary or by a co-trustee, successor trustee, or other person acting on behalf of one or 
more beneficiaries.”).  
172  2005 WL 645143 (S.D. Ind. 2005). 
173  Id.  
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court’s acceptance of the trust beneficiaries as clients of the trustee’s investment advice is an 
important step in light of Selzer. The court in Montana, however, relied primarily not on the sepa-
rate legal status and roles of the trustee and beneficiary but on the strength of the holding in 
Abrahamson. In addition to the court’s analysis in Smith and Montana, provisions of the Advisers 
Act support holding that a trustee is an investment adviser.174   
E. Engaged in the Business 
Section 202(a)(11) requires an investment adviser to “engage in the business” of providing in-
vestment advice. In interpreting this element, the Commission staff in SEC Release 1092175 and 
courts176 have relied primarily on the decision in Zinn v. Parrish177. After reviewing Zinn, some 
observations are offered.    
1. Zinn v. Parrish 
In Zinn v. Parrish, a private action, the court held that Zinn, a sports manager, provided services to 
Parish, a professional football player, that did not, among other things, satisfy the engaged in the 
business element. While providing sports management services, Zinn obtained a list of securities 
recommendations prepared by other persons, screened it and forwarded it to Parrish. The court 
acknowledged that had Zinn “made a business”178 of screening securities recommendations, he 
would be required to register as an investment adviser. However, this “isolated transaction”179 
with Parrish was “incident”180 to the main purpose of the manager-client relationship.   
While Zinn’s holding has factual support, its legal analysis raises questions. The court in Zinn anal-
ogized the sport manager’s role to that of the professional trustee described in In re Loring. Zinn 
characterized the trustee In re Loring as a “professional trustee whose advice to his clients is ‘sole-
ly incidental’ to his duty as a professional trustee.”181 Also, as part of its discussion of In re Loring, 
the court in Zinn noted that the “SEC further concluded that the trustee was not an investment 
adviser because he did not ‘hold himself out as being engaged in the business of giving advice to 
others as to securities.’”182 Zinn went on to apply factors noted in Commission staff No-Action      
 
                                                
174  Section 203, Registration of Investment Advisers, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3, requires and exempts certain investment advis-
ers (as defined under § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)) to register with the Commission. Section 203(b)(4),  
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(4), exempts from registration an investment adviser that is a trustee to a charitable organiza-
tion. § 203(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(5), exempts from registration an investment adviser that is a trustee to a 
plan described under § 414(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 that provides investment advice exclusively 
to the plan.  
175  SEC Release 1092, 4 & n.7 (“The ‘Business’ Standard [...] The staff considers a person to be ‘in the business’ of 
providing advice if the person: [...] (iii) on anything other than rare, isolated and non-periodic instances, provides 
specific investment advice. FN7 (Zinn v. Parris, 644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1981)”). 
176  See, e.g., Wang v. Gordon, 715 F.2d 1187, 1192-93 (7th Cir. 1983) (relying on the Zinn v. Parrish “engage in the 
business” approach); Pozez v. Ethanol Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2009 WL 2176574 6 (D. Ariz. 2009) (relying on the Zinn 
v. Parrish “isolated transactions” language). 
177  644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1981). 
178  Id. at 364. 
179  Zinn, 644 F.2d at 364.  
180  Id. 
181  Id.   
182  Id. 
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Letters183 for determining whether one “holds himself out”184 to the public as an investment ad-
viser. More fundamentally, Zinn’s characterization of In re Loring fails to recognize that the vast ma-
jority of services provided by Loring were under court supervision, subject to a bonding require-
ment. This fact would support the Commission granting the exemptive request in In re Loring. 
Similarly, Zinn appears not to appreciate that the standard applied by the Commission in the In Re 
Loring exemptive application under § 202(a)(11)(H) is whether the applicant is a person “not with-
in the intent” of § 202(a)(11). This is a far more general and inclusive standard than determining 
the reach of the engage in the business language of § 202(a)(11).   
Finally, the Zinn decision does not acknowledge that Congress in enacting the Advisers Act choose 
to include “solely incidental” and “holding out” language in other provisions of the Adviser Act but 
not § 202(a)(11). Indeed, Zinn’s imposition of the “holding out” to the public test and “solely inci-
dental” limitation is not supported by the language of § 202(a)(11) and is undercut by the struc-
ture of the Advisers Act. Under § 202(a)(11), the definition of an investment adviser does not 
include “solely incidental” language. In contrast, the professionals exception under § 202(a)(11)(B) 
and broker-dealer exception under § 202(a)(11)(C) both limit offering investment adviser that is 
“solely incidental to the conduct” of the practice of a profession and business as a broker or deal-
er, respectively. Under § 202(a)(11) the definition of an investment adviser does not include any 
reference to “holding out” to the public. Under former § 203(b)(3) an investment adviser is not 
required to register with the Commission if certain requirements are met, such as that it does not 
“hold[s] itself out to generally to the public as an investment adviser.” Zinn’s approach is difficult 
to accept in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Company, Inc.,185 
where the court held that “when ‘Congress includes particular language in one section of a stat-
ute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’”  
2. Alternative Approaches to Engage in the Business 
Courts may benefit from taking a fresh approach to the engage in the business element. Although 
neither the word “engage” nor “business” is defined by the Advisers Act, these words appear in 
other federal statutes and courts have routinely looked to their “ordinary and natural”186 mean-
ings in interpreting the words “engage”187 and “business”188 Some courts have been called upon 
                                                
183  See supra footnote 165 above; see also Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 137 n.11 (2d Cir. 2011) (dis-
cussing degree of judicial deference due Commission staff No-Action Letters); Gryl ex rel. Shire Pharm. Grp. PLC. v. 
Shire Pharm. Grp. PLC, 298 F.3d 136, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (“It must be remembered, howev-
er, that SEC no action letter responses are staff interpretations rather than formal Commission action and thus 
are of more limited utility than formal rulemaking or policies announced in SEC releases.”).  
184  Zinn, 644 F.2d at 363 (citations omitted) (“Among the factors the SEC looks to in determining whether someone 
‘holds himself out’ as an investment adviser are: ‘(t)he maintenance of a listing as an investment adviser in a tele-
phone or business directory’; ‘the expression of willingness to existing clients or others to accept new clients’; or 
‘the use of a letterhead indicating any activity as an investment adviser.’”). 
185  534 U.S. 438, 453, (2002) (citations omitted). 
186  Scherr v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 703 F.3d 1069, 1077 (7th Cir. 2013) (“When we do not have statutory definitions 
available, we accord words and phrases their ordinary and natural meaning and avoid rendering them mean-
ingless, redundant, or superfluous; we view words not in isolation but in the context of the terms that sur-
round them; we likewise construe statutes in the context of the entire statutory scheme and avoid rendering 
statutory provisions ambiguous, extraneous, or redundant; we favor the more reasonable result; and we 
avoid construing statutes contrary to the clear intent of the statutory scheme.”). 
187  See, e.g., U.S. v. Graham, 305 F.3d 1094, 1102 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The term ‘engage’ is commonly defined as ‘to 
occupy or involve oneself; take part; be active.’ Webster’s New World College Dictionary at 450 (3rd ed. 
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to interpret the phrase “engage in the business” as it appears in other federal statutes,189 in-
cluding definitional provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act.190 
In addition to interpreting this language, the Advisers Act itself offers guidance. § 222, State 
Regulation of Investment Advisers, among other things, addresses the allocation investment 
adviser oversight authority among states. In part, this allocation is dependent on the location 
of the advisers “place of business.”191 To explain the meaning of this term, the Commission 
promulgated Rule 222-1, Definitions, which states in part: “(a) Place of business. ‘Place of busi-
ness’ of an investment adviser means: (1) An office at which the investment adviser regularly 
provides investment advisory services, solicits, meets with, or otherwise communicates with 
clients […].”192 Putting aside the office location context, these factors arguably describe in gen-
eral terms conduct that tend to reflect engaging in the business of an investment adviser. They 
focus on regularly providing investment advice, soliciting clients and servicing clients. At its 
essence, these activities speak to the potential components of an engaged in the business 
approach that are consistent with the language and structure of the Advisers Act.  
VI. Conclusion 
This analysis of judicial approaches to interpreting the elements of § 202(a)(11) and the accom-
panying observations illustrate the variety of definitional issues that for the most part remain 
undeveloped. In some instances, courts have tended toward an “I know it when I see it”193 tact in 
relying on certain facts to support investment adviser status, with little resort to the language or 
structure of the Advisers Act. In others, there is some effort to identify a nascent legal concept to 
support a particular approach, but again without developing it within the structure of the Advis-
ers Act or other relevant legal authority. It is hoped that some of the observations offered may 
provide a starting point for building a more grounded and reflective approach to interpreting 
these elements, which may eventually be recognized by courts as an appropriate approach. 
                                                                                                                                    
1997)”); see also Gibbs v. I-Flow, Inc. 2009 WL 482285 3 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (applying similar dictionary definition 
to define the term “engage”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 474 (5th ed. 1979) (defining “engaged” as “to employ 
or involve oneself; to take part in; to embark on.”).  
188  See, e.g., U.S. v. Graham, 305 F.3d 1094, 1103 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002) (“See also Black’s Law Dictionary at 198 (6th 
ed. 1990) (defining business as ‘[e]mployment, occupation, profession, or commercial activity engage in for 
gain or livelihood.’”); see also U.S. v. Mazza-Alaluf, 607 F. Supp. 2d 484, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The statute [USA 
Patriot Act] does not define the ‘business,’ which should be afforded its ordinary meaning as an enterprise 
that operates for profit. See Travelers Insurance Co. v. Carpenter, 411 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 2005) (utilizing 
Black’s Law Dictionary to define a term undefined by statute); Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defining 
business as ‘[a] commercial enterprise carried on for profit.’”). 
189  See, e.g., Bryan v. U.S., 524 U.S. 184 (1998) (discussing, inter alia, the “engaged in the business” language of 18 
U.S.C. 922(a)(1)); U.S. v. Day, 476 F.2d 562, 567 (6th Cir. 1973) (citations omitted) (interpreting “engaged in the 
business” phrase). 
190  U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Hall, 2014 WL 4942312 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (discussing, inter alia, 
the engaged in the business language of § 1a(12)(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act defining a commodity 
trading advisor). 
191  See § 222, State Regulation of Investment Advisers, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-22 (reference to investment adviser “place 
of business” throughout § 222). 
192  Rule 222-1, Definitions, 17 C.F.R. § 275.22-1. See also Rule 202(a)(30)-1(c)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 275.2(a)(30)-1(c)(4), 
(defining investment adviser “place of business” as identical to definition of investment adviser “place of busi-
ness” appearing in Rule 222-1(a), 17 C.F.R. § 275.22-1(a)). See generally Rules Implementing Amendments to 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1633 (May 15, 1997), 62 FR 28112 
(May 22, 1997) (adopting rule release).  
193  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart concurring) (when discussing difficulty in defining hard-core 
pornography, Justice Stewart stated, “I know it when I see it.”)  
